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A B S T R A C T
The thesis is primarily an empirical investigation of Australian mortgage 
loan prepayment from a modelling perspective.
The first objective of the research is to develop a variable-rate loan prepay­
ment model that takes into account the Australian mortgage market struc­
ture. The model proves very successful when tested empirically, and is able 
to explain the partial prepayment features of the Australian market as well 
as full prepayments.
Secondly, Australian fixed-rate prepayment is investigated. Empirical 
tests are carried out on the non-linear Stanton model and a linear model 
using Australian prepayment data. Both models perform very well.
Next a combined model is formed by combining the (fixed-rate) Stanton 
model with a variable-rate model. The combined model again proves very 
successful when empirically tested.
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C h a p te r  0 
In tro d u c tio n
The thesis is primarily an empirical investigation of prepayment modelling 
of Australian mortgage loans.
Prepayment models are designed to estimate prepayment as a function of 
independent variables, the most important of which are interest-rate variables 
such as short-term rates, long-term rates, slope of the yield curve, history of 
the short-term rate, and so on.
The two main categories of mortgage loans are “variable-rate” and “fixed- 
rate” , and different prepayment patterns are evident for each category. Hence 
different prepayment models are required for each interest-rate category.
Whereas refinancing prepayment results in the mortgage holder com­
pletely paying out the loan, partial prepayments are payments which exceed 
the mortgage holder’s required scheduled monthly payments without paying 
out the loan completely. In comparison to United States mortgage prepay­
ment Australian prepayment’s most unique characteristic is the high level of 
partial prepayment.
Comparison with the United States mortgage industry is a theme recur­
ring throughout the thesis. The main reason for making comparisons with 
the United States mortgage industry rather than some other nation’s mort­
gage industry, is that most of the research in the field of mortgage-backed 
security prepayment, (and mortgage-backed security valuation), has occurred 
in the United States; a secondary reason is the similarity of the economies of 
Australia and the United States. Two other relevent comparisons with the
1
2.
United States in relation to mortgage prepayment which can be mentioned 
here are:
• all United States mortgage holders can claim interest paid on their loan 
outstanding principal as a tax deduction, whereas Australian mortgage 
holders cannot.
• the ratio of fixed-rate loans to variable-rate loans in the United States 
is higher than the corresponding ratio in Australia, and usually much 
higher; for example most of the time over 80% of United States mort­
gage loans are fixed-rate, whereas in Australia at least 80% of mortgage 
loans are variable-rate (all the time). Figure 1.1, in chapter 1 shows 
the relevent United States data over the years 1985 to 2001.
A n O verview  o f th e  M ain C hapters:
Chapter 1 introduces the main facts, concepts, theories, formulae, and 
methodologies which are used in the later research chapters, as appropriate 
for the Australian mortgage industry environment. The topics introduced in 
chapter 1 include mortgages, mortgage interest-rates, mortgage loan valua­
tion, securitization, mortgage-backed security valuation, and prepayment.
The topic of chapter 2 is the variable-rate prepayment model. The chap­
ter begins with a literature review of leading (U.S.) articles on variable-rate 
loan based mortgage-backed security prepayment models. The focus then 
shifts to the Australian mortgage loans prepayment modelling environment 
with a view to exploration of how Australian prepayment should be modelled. 
Reasons for the extent of the difference of levels of partial prepayments for 
Australia and the U.S., are investigated; appropriate variables are designed, 
and an Australian partial prepayment model is formulated. The partial pre­
payment model so formed is then combined with appropriate variables from 
the (already proven) U.S. prepayment models to form an Australian pre­
payment model which is empirically evaluated using Australian mortgage 
prepayment data.
Chapter 3 focuses on modelling fixed-rate (Australian) prepayment. The 
chapter begins with a literature review of of the main types of fixed-rate 
prepayment models, including the Stanton(1995) prepayment model, which
3takes a fundamentally different approach to prepayment modelling. Follow­
ing the literature review is an empirical evaluation of the prepayment models 
which were developed in chapter 2, here applied to fixed-rate Australian pre­
payment data. Next the Stanton model is tested on this same data. The 
statement that “Australia is the most interest-rate sensitive nation in the 
world” has been made in the media. The question as to whether this interest- 
rate sensitivity translates into prepayment sensitivity is partially answered 
by the Stanton model test results.
A “combined prepayment model” is the topic of chapter 4. The combined 
model, which is formed directly from the Stanton model, (a fixed-rate model), 
and the variable-rate model developed in chapter 2, is intended to create 
a more universal-purpose prepayment model, which fills the gaps resulting 
from the specialised nature of the component variable-rate and fixed-rate 
models. To test the combined model a combined data set is formed from 
the respective fixed-rate and variable-rate data sets. The linear variable-rate 
models are also re-tested on this combined data set.
The Main Findings of the Research were:
(i) For variable-rate mortgage holders:
Both partial prepayment and full prepayment are strongly affected by 
the amount by which the mortgage holder’s highest interest-rate level 
attained over the prior course of the loan, exceeds the current market 
mortgage variable-rate.
(ii) The ratio of average after-tax share market returns to mortgage rates 
was introduced as a variable following from the idea of partial prepay­
ment as an alternative investment to shares. This ratio was found to be 
highly negatively associated with full prepayments, consistently, over 
all rate categories, (variable, fixed, and combined).
(iii) The prepayment data revealed that in Australia partial prepayment is 
on average approximately one third of full prepayments for variable- 
rate loans, and slightly less, (closer to a quarter), of full prepayments 
for fixed-rate loans .
(iv) Partial prepayment is not confined to variable-rate mortgage holders;
4Australian fixed-rate mortgage holders also choose to partially prepay, 
as is shown by the next finding.
(v) For fixed-rate mortgage holders:
• partial prepayment is affected by the volatility of rates, (over the 
previous year);
• a fall in rates often triggers partial prepayment (rather than the 
expected refinancing), the impact of the rate change, on the partial 
prepayments, fading as time, (from the rate change), passes.
(vi) Refinancing sensitivity in Australia is much less than U.S. refinancing 
sensitivity.
Two findings unrelated to interest-rates were:
(vii) Mortgage holders in Australia, when compared to their U.S. counter­
parts, are much more likely to prepay their loans for non-interest-rate 
related reasons such as relocation or changes in family circumstances.
(viii) (As is the case in the U.S.), the age of the pool, (or the average number 
of months since origination of the mortgages in the pool), was consis­
tently, (over all the categories of rate types: variable-rate, fixed-rate, 
and combined), a strong influence on full prepayments.
Research Contribution:
The originality in this thesis stems from the unique characteristics of the 
Australian mortgage market. The data set is a new data set for prepay­
ment modelling. The new data set has required the introduction of new 
prepayment modelling theory, mostly in the form of new variable defini­
tions. Whereas previous Australian empirical research on mortgage prepay­
ment, (for example Ang(1995), and Barrett(1995)), has been restricted, by 
researcher choice, to fixed-rate loan prepayment models, this thesis expands 
the Australian prepayment research field to include prepayment of variable- 
rate loans, (which comprise 80 — 90% of Australian mortgage loans), and 
partial prepayment. In the United States, (where, as previously mentioned,
bthe bulk of prepayment modelling research has been carried out), partial pre­
payment is so insignificant a part of prepayment that inclusion in prepayment 
models is regarded as unnecessary; clearly in Australia, where our prepay­
ment data has revealed that partial prepayment is on average approximately 
one third of full prepayments, inclusion of partial prepayment in prepayment 
models must be regarded as essential. The expansion of the modelling field 
to include variable-rate prepayment is achieved through the adaptation of 
the United States-based variable-rate prepayment models to the Australian 
mortgage environment and requires only the modification of some variables. 
The inclusion of partial prepayment modelling, however, does require new 
theory and the development of a partial prepayment sub-model.
Also investigation of the effect of the share market on prepayment has 
not previously been a component of Australian or United States prepayment 
modelling.
C h a p te r  1
M o rtg ag es , M B S s, P re p a y m e n t
1.1 In troduction
Chapter 1 provides introduction, background, framework, and context for 
the research of the following chapters.
Following is an overview of the chapter by sections:
Section 1.2 provides a set of relevent facts and assumptions about mortgages 
and mortgage interest-rates. Section 1.3 describes some underlying theory 
and methodology which is used in following chapters. Section 1.4 introduces 
securitization and mortgage-backed securities. Section 1.5 introduces pre­
payment of mortgages. Section 1.6 shows how the rate of prepayment is 
estimated in practice. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 R elevent F acts/A ssu m p tion s for A ustralian  
and U .S . M ortgages
• Residential mortgages represent the single largest category of private 
debt in the Australian, (and United States), financial market(s). 
(Jegadeesh and Ju(2000) [39]).
• “the average life of an Australian mortgage [is] now 2.9 years-before 
they are paid out or refinanced.”
7
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(The Weekend Australian, April 22 — 23, 2006).
• Due-on-Sale.
Australian mortgage contracts contain a “due-on-sale” clause; in other 
words, Australian mortgages are not transferable when the property is 
sold.
• tax. Australian mortgage holders cannot claim interest paid on their 
mortgage loans as a tax deduction, whereas United States mortgage 
holders can.
An exception to the preceeding is the Australian investor mortgage 
holder who is purchasing for rental purposes rather than being an 
“owner/occupier”; (see also table 2.1 in chapter 2). Investor mort­
gage holders can claim interest paid on their mortgage loans as a tax 
deduction.
These differences in tax rules have significant implications for the pre­
payment behaviour of Australian and United States mortgage holders, 
as will be seen in following chapters.
Facts/Assum ptions relating to Variable vs Fixed rate mortgages:
• fixed-rate mortgages.
A fixed-rate mortgage, FRM, is a loan where the interest-rate on the 
loan is fixed. While in the United States the interest-rate on a fixed- 
rate mortgage is fixed for the entire loan period, (usually 25 — 30 years), 
in Australia the interest-rate is fixed for sub-periods, (1 ,2 ,3 ,... ,15 
years), of the full loan term period. Loans with a fixed term longer 
than 5 years are very rare in Australia.
• variable-rate mortgages.
A variable-rate mortgage, VRM, (in Australia), is a loan to a (home) 
borrower where the interest-rate on the loan varies according to the 
discretion of the lender. Competition amongst lenders ensures that 
this rate will be the short-term interest-rate, (referred to as the cash 
rate), established by the Reserve Bank of Australia, (RBA), plus some 
margin rate which can vary from lender to lender. In the United States
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of United States mortgages originated as 
fixed-rate, (rather than variable-rate).
variable-rate mortgage interest-rates are adjusted according to indices.
Fabozzi and Modigliani,(1992), [27], attribute the introduction of 
VRM loans to what they call the “mismatch problem”: the fact that 
lenders are (usually) borrowing short and lending long. VRMs “have 
been popular with lenders because they shift [the upside] interest-rate 
risk from the lender to the borrower.” [The risk of falling rates is 
borne by the lender because of the repayment option given to the bor­
rower.] VRMs are referred to as “ARMs” , adjustable-rate mortgages, 
in the United States. Further discussion of VRMs, (specifically in re­
lation to prepayment for variable-rate loans), occurs as part of chapter 
2:“Variable-Rate Prepayment Modelling”.
• Ratio of fixed-rate to variable-rate mortgages.
Figure 1.1, (from Cocco and Campbell, (2003) [15]), shows the percent-
;t 
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age of United States mortgage loans which were originated as fixed- 
rate, (rather than variable-rate), over the years 1985 to 2001. The 
graph shows that the proportion of fixed-rate loans varies approxi­
mately between 30% and 90%. There was no available corresponding 
graph for Australian mortgages; however several sources, (including 
NAB(2002) [45], and Research Note(2003) [49]), document that the 
proportion of loans which are fixed-rate in Australia varies approxi­
mately between ten and twenty percent. Fixed-rate and variable-rate 
mortgages can show significantly different prepayment behaviour.
• The fixed/variable risk premium, for a given loan amount, over a 
given term period, is the (interest-rate) premium paid (by a fixed-rate 
borrower), for the insurance against the [upside] interest-rate risk borne 
by a variable-rate borrower, (for the same loan amount, and over the 
same term period).
Figure 1.2 shows a particularly clear example of the fixed/variable 
risk premium in the United States mortgage environment.
As Mansukhani and Srinivasan(2001) [42] state:
“Irrespective of [yield] curve shape and the level of interest-rates, the 
weighted average mortgage coupon of newly originated GNMA1 ARMs 
has averaged 160 basis points lower than fixed mortgage rates.”
The fixed/variable risk premium is invariably not apparent in the 
Australia mortgage environment because loans with fixed terms longer 
than 5 years are very rare.
The (usually) lower coupon rate for the variable-rate loan implies, 
(after applying annuity formula (IT), that a larger loan size is available 
to the borrower who chooses a variable-rate loan rather than a fixed- 
rate loan. Quoting Mansukhani and Srinivasan(2001) [42] once more: 
“Most GNMA ARM borrowers use an ARM to qualify for a larger loan 
than they might otherwise be able to obtain using fixed-rate financing. 
This is evident from the larger loan balances on GNMA ARMs versus 
GNMA FRMs, which respectively stand at $115,000 and $98,000 based
*GNMA stands for “Government National Mortgage Association”. GNMA is a United 
States government agency which issues mortgage-backed securities; (mortgage-backed se­
curities are described in section 1.4).
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Figure 1.2: A n E xam ple o f th e  fixed /variab le  risk prem ium  (in th e  
U .S .)
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on the 1999 vintage” .
1.3 U nderlying th eo ry /m eth o d o lo g y  relevent 
to  following chapters
1.3.1 V alue o f a (loan) stream  o f cash  flows
Interest rates are stochastic. Therefore the present value v, of a stream of 
cashflows: CF^,CF2, ...  , CFn, with corresponding interest-rates: r i , r 2 , . . .  , r n, 
can be expressed as:
CF1 CF2 _________ CF\_________
( 1 + n )  (l + r i ) ( l + r 2) (1 + ri)(l + r2) • • • (1 + r„)'
However, the simplest method of estimating v is to evaluate the stream 
of cash flows as an annuity which assumes a constant interest-rate. Then v 
is written as
o  r %
v  =  >   --------- — .
t r  (1 + r )'
When this formula is applied to value a mortgage loan consisting of equal 
monthly payments M P , (referred to as a level payment mortgage), v is given
by
(l.i)
v = original outstanding principal MB0
MP  *
1 (i + 5)r \ - T n
where
- —monthly mortgage rate, {n = 12);
T=the number of years of the loan term.
(The notation here is from Fabozzi/Modigliani [27]). Equation (1.1) provides
the usual mortgage industry method, (for all Australian mortgages, (both 
variable-rate and fixed-rate)), of calculating the monthly payments MP, for
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a given loan amount MB0, and given coupon rate r.
The evaluation of a stream of cash flows, when the stochastic property of 
interest-rates is retained, is more complex; methods include: partial differen­
tial equation solving, liklihood function solving, and simulation techniques.
The evaluation of a stream of cash flows occurs only once in this thesis, 
(as part of the empirical research); there, (in the tests of the Stanton model), 
a constant interest-rate assumption is made.
1.3.2 V alue D eco m p o sitio n  P rin cip le  (for secu rities w ith  
em b ed d ed  op tion s)
The value decomposition principle is a methodology of pricing securities 
with embedded options. As discussed in Jamshidian and Zhu’s paper “Anal­
ysis of Bonds with Imbedded Options” [38], the value of a security with an 
embedded option is often separable into the components: value of security 
without the option, and value of the option alone. The value of a callable 
bond is a good example of this principle:
Price(Callable Bond) = Price( Noncallable Bond)
-Price(Call Option on Noncallable Bond).
Stanton(1995) [54], (reviewed in subsection 3.2.3), uses the value decompo­
sition principle to formulate a mortgage-backed security valuation model.
1.4 M o rtg a g e  B acked  S ecu ritie s
1.4.1 S ecu ritiza tion
Securitization is the process of pooling and repackaging the streams of 
cash flows from financial assets (such as loans), into securities which are 
then sold to investors. The securities so formed are valued according to 
the cash flows of the underlying financial assets. Mortgage-backed securities 
where the underlying pool of financial assets consists of mortgages, are the 
archetypal securitized product. The mortgages are usually residential home
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loans though commercial mortgages are now also often pooled.
The payoff structure of securitized instruments can be categorized as:
(i) Pass-throughs where the security represents direct ownership of the 
assets which have been pooled. The originator or issuer of the securities 
services the pooled financial assets by collecting payments of principal 
and interest but all financial risks are passed through to the investor.
(ii) Pay-throughs-For these securities direct ownership of the pooled finan­
cial assets is retained by the issuer. The cash flows from these assets 
are then dedicated to the investors.
Most residential mortgage-backed securities are pass-throughs.
The following excerpt from Brailsford and Heaney [11], illustrates the 
concept of (mortgage-backed) securitization.
Suppose that a bank has 10 outstanding mortgages. In order 
to raise additional finance the bank may wish to issue securities 
offering the cash flows arising from the mortgages as collateral. 
However, if the bank were to sell each mortgage separately then 
investors would be exposed to the uncertainty of the cash flows 
arising from payments on the individual mortgages. These uncer­
tainties arise because of untimely repayments, interest-rate risk 
in the case of variable loans, prepayment risk as the loan may 
be paid off in unequal instalments, and default risk where the 
loan repayments are not made. The uncertainty of the cash flows 
would make the security unattractive to investors. However, if 
the bank were to pool the 10 loans together and offer the aggre­
gate cash flows of the pooled loans as collateral, then much of the 
uncertainty associated with the cash flows is reduced. In essence, 
the pooling of the loans uses the benefits of diversification to re­
duce cash flow uncertainty. The result is that the issued security 
is more attractive to investors.
[Italics added.]
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1.4.2 A  B rief H istory  o f S ecu ritiza tion  in A u stra lia
The first Australian MBS were issued in the mid 1980’s, but MBS re­
mained a domestic market until 1997. Before 1992, most issuance was done 
through state-government sponsored programs, (for example FANMAC2). 
Private sector programs have since rapidly replaced the government pro­
grams in issuance, and the latter have almost completely faded from the 
picture. Withholding tax treatment for MBSs changed in 1997, which paved 
the way for European market access first, and US market access later. With 
the expanded markets to tap, issuance of Australian MBS surged. (See fig­
ure 1.3).
As in the US, Australian MBS issuers can be divided into banks and non­
banks. Non-banks are also known as “mortgage managers”. The Australian 
mortgage managers, like US mortgage finance companies, rely mostly on cap­
ital markets for their funding, that is they rely on securitization. Prior to 
the early 1990’s banks had preferred to use other means, such as bond issue 
or deposits, to fund their mortgage lending. However the combined effects 
of increased competition with the mortgage managers, and the opening of 
the US and European markets to Australian MBS, have attracted Australian 
banks to MBS issuance. Edey and Gray [23] suggest that securitization has 
narrowed the difference between standard housing loan rates and the cash 
rate from about 400 basis points to around 200 basis points. Figure 1.4, 
(titled “Effect of Securitization”), gives credibility to Edey and Gray’s sug­
gestion. The time period of the horizontal axis in figure 1.4 was determined 
by the span of available RBA mortgage manager data, which begins in June 
1993.
[The sources for this section were Edey and Gray [23] and Weaver etal [61].]
2FANMAC, (First Australian National Mortgage Acceptance Co. Ltd.), was 25% NSW 
government owned and Australia’s largest MBS issuer in the 1980s and 1990s. FANMAC 
was privatised in approximately the year 2000, and is now named “RESIMAC”.
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1.4.3 M B S V aluation  and P rep aym en t M odelling
MBS valuation can be a difficult exercise and is beyond the scope of this 
thesis; nevertheless the following comment, in relation to MBS valuation and 
prepayment modelling, is necessary.
C onventional O ption Pricing T h eory  cannot b e used in M B S val­
uation:
The difficulties associated with MBS valuation arise mostly from the fact 
that mortgage holders are typically allowed to prepay any portion of the 
outstanding mortgage principal at any time during the life of the mortgage. 
(These prepayments of principal augment the scheduled repayments of prin­
cipal and payments of interest which are made to the MBS investor, thus 
introducing uncertainty into the amounts and the timing of the cash flows.) 
The prepayment option is the same as a call option, and hence MBSs are 
callable bonds. (The MBS investor implicitly writes a call option on the 
mortgage holder’s bond.) However the theory of pricing callable bonds can­
not be directly applied to price MBS because mortgage holders, in some 
cases, may not behave according to the (option pricing theory) assumption 
of financial rationality. For example many mortgage holders prepay when the 
value of the mortgage is below the value of the principal outstanding.3 (In 
option pricing theory such an option exercise would be classified as an “out- 
of-the-money-call” .) Hence mortgage prepayment requires modelling theory 
which goes beyond conventional option pricing theory; mortgage prepayment 
modelling is introduced in section 1.5.
1.4 .4  (S ecu ritization ) Facts
• In the United States only a small percentage of securitized mortgages 
are variable-rate; for example between 1999 and 2001 only 7.8% of se­
curitized mortgages were variable-rate. [This accounts for why most 
United States research on MBSs is concerned with fixed-rate mort­
gages].
3Relocation of the mortgage holder, for example, may determine such a prepayment. 
The prepayment is rational but could be classified as financially irrational.
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• In 2001, only about 1/5 to 1/4 of Australian mortgage loans were 
securitized. Although banks originate the bulk of mortgage loans in 
Australia, bank mortgages then, (2001), made up only about half the 
volume in the securitization market, and hence about eighty percent of 
bank mortgages were not securitized.
1.5  In tr o d u c tio n  to  P r e p a y m e n t
1.5 .1  C ategories o f P repaym en t
Mortgage holders who prepay can be categorised as:
• Home sellers or Relocators. These mortgage holders are prepaying 
due to job relocation or changes to family circumstances. In prepay­
ment modelling terminology this type of prepayment is referred to as 
exogeneous prepayment, that is prepayment unrelated to changes in 
interest-rates;
• Refinancers, who prepay to take advantage of lower market interest- 
rates;
• Switchers, who prepay to change the loan type, (for example switching 
from fixed to variable or vice versa);
• Partial prepayers-partial prepayments are payments which exceed the 
scheduled monthly payments, (without paying off the loan completely). 
There are different motivations for partial prepayments for different 
types of mortgages, for example fixed rate or variable rate;
• Defaulters.
Each of these categories, except partial prepayments, are full prepayments, 
that is the mortgage holder repays the loan in full, terminating the contract.
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1.5.2 Factors A ffecting  P rep aym en t (for F ix ed -R a te  
M ortgages)
Most research in prepayment modelling has been based on the US mort­
gage market which, until the late 1970’s, consisted almost completely of 
fixed-rate mortgages. For fixed-rate prepayment models the following four 
factors have been a basis for prepayment models.
(i) The Time-Dependent or Exogenous Factor
The observation that prepayment occurs even when there is no financial 
motivation, (sometimes expressed as “when the prepayment option is 
out-of-the-money”), makes evident the non-financial motivations for 
prepayment, such as: sale of house, job relocation, death, divorce, and 
so on. These interest-rate independent factors are grouped together as 
the time-dependent or exogenous factors.
This component of the prepayment rate is assumed to increase to a 
maximum, (usually over the first 30 months of the life of the mortgage), 
and then remain constant or decline slowly.
(ii) The Interest-Rate Factor
The second main factor affecting prepayment is the interest-rate fac­
tor. The interest-rate factor is a measure of interest-rate change relative 
to the existing mortgage contract rate. The most common represen­
tation of the interest-rate factor is the “refinancing incentive” , devel­
oped by Richard and Roll [48], which is the ratio of the existing mort­
gage contract rate to the current market mortgage rate, (often denoted 
C/R).  The difference between the mortgage origination coupon rate 
and the current market mortgage rate is also often used to represent 
the interest-rate factor. Figure 1.5 shows the impact of the interest- 
rate differential on prepayment rates. Stanton [54] uses “Transaction 
Costs” to represent the interest-rate factor, (though he has a very spe­
cific meaning for the term); this will be considered in more detail in 
subsection 3.2.3.
(iii) The Seasonality Factor
The seasonality factor effect takes into account the observed rise in
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Figure 1.5: Impact of Interest Rate Changes on Prepayment Rates.
summer and fall in winter of prepayments.
(iv) The Burnout, (or Path Dependency), Factor
The burnout factor adjusts prepayment speeds to take into account of 
the fact that after each wave of refinancing, the pool becomes slightly 
less sensitive to subsequent interest-rate reductions. This is because 
every pool consists of borrowers with different degrees of interest-rate 
sensitivity; when rates drop, the more interest-rate sensitive ones leave, 
leaving the pool less rate-sensitive for future interest-rate drops.
Fabozzi and Modigliani [27], state that about 95% of the variation in [fixed- 
rate loan] prepayment is explained by the above four factors. Models which 
incorporate more variables, (for example MBS pool characteristics such as 
LVR4, and geographical location, and/or economic variables such as GNP 
growth, inflation, and unemployment rate), have been found to improve his­
torical fit but not improve forecasts, (see Belbase(2001) [8] for details). Hence 
a parsimonious model with only the above four factors is often preferred.
4“LVR” is an acronym for “Loan to Value Ratio” . See also table 2.1.
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1.5 .3  C on cep ts from  D u ration  M od ellin g  and Survival 
A nalysis
Two concepts, (from the fields of “duration modelling” and “survival anal­
ysis” in statistics and econometrics), which are often used in prepayment 
modelling are the “survival function” and the “hazard function”.
{Duration modelling originally developed from studies related to the 
durability of electric and electronic components. The techniques have been 
applied by social scientists and economists to such topics as the length of 
time from a purchase until a warranty claim is made}.
Green and Shoven(1986) [30] pioneered the use of this theory in prepay­
ment modelling.
The survival function and the hazard function are now defined, not in 
the general sense, but as they apply specifically to prepayment modelling. In 
the following let “r ” be a continuous random variable representing the time 
until prepayment of a mortgage with realization “£”.
Definition 1.5.1 The survival function is the probability S(t) of no prepay­
ment occurring until after some time t.
S(t) = 1 — F(t) = Pr{r > £},
where “F ” denotes the CDF, (the cumulative distribution function, which is 
the probability of prepayment occurring prior to, or at time t).
Definition 1.5.2 The prepayment function is the (hazard) function which 
represents the probability, at time t, that a given mortgage will be prepaid in 
the next instant of time, conditional on the mortgage not having been prepaid 
prior to time t.
{The Schwartz and Torous(1989) notation: “7r( t , v ,6)”, will be used here to 
denote the prepayment function; 6 — (#i, 02, • • • , Ok) is a vector of parameters 
to be estimated, and v = (iq, u2, . . .  , v3) is a vector of explanatory variables, 
(representing the prevailing state of the economy), upon which the time until 
prepayment may depend .}
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An expression for 7r(t,v,0)  can be formed by letting the time at which 
prepayment occurs be t + At, letting At  —>• 0, and applying the following 
probability algebra. (In the following equation system un(t\v} 0 )” is read as: 
“prepayment function value as a function of t for given (fixed) values of v 
and G\)
n( t \ v , 0 )=  lim M t < r < t  + A t | r > t }
Ai—>0+ A t
Pr{(£ < r  < + A and (r >
= Ä -------"  A i.Pr{r > ------------- ’
(since Pr{A| J3}=Pr{A PI B}/Pi{B}),
Pr{(£ < r  < t + At}
= hm --------- -—— -------- ,
At—>o+ A t.S(t)
1 I" F(t + At) — F(t)~
” 5(t) Af “ + [ At
_
where /(t|u , 0) denotes the probability density function which is equal to the 
probability of prepayment at time t, (for given (fixed) values of v and 0).
An alternative expression for the prepayment rate n( t , v :0) is shown 
through the following:
m  dF/dt  - 1 (1  - F ( t ) )  
S(t) S(t) S(t)
m
S(t)
(where uv" and “0” have been omitted to simplify the notation). If the 
instantaneous conditional prepayment rate is supposed not to vary over time, 
that is, if 7r(£, v, 9) is a constant, say -0, then
which has solution S(t) = Ke ^t . The initial condition 5(0) = 1 implies
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that K  = 1; hence
S(t) = e-*1.
Thus the exponential distribution can be used to model the survival function 
as applied to mortgage prepayments.
All the prepayment models described in the literature reviews in this the­
sis, (except the PSA model), use hazard function theory in their formulation.
1.5.3.1 T he M em oryless P rop erty  o f th e  E xp on en tia l D istr ib u tion
Prom the definition of conditional probability:
r  I \ Pr(T >r  > t + 5t\r > t) = ———
Pr(r
e -ip{t+8t)
Therefore P r(r > t + 5t\r > t) — ----— —
= = Pr(r >
that is the probability of no mortgage prepayment occurring until after time 
t p  St given that no mortgage prepayment has occurred until time t, is equal 
to the probability of a new mortgage prepayment not occurring until after 
time St. Taking complements leads to the statement that the probability 
of a mortgage prepayment occurring between t and t 4- St is equal to the 
probability of prepayment occurring between origination and St. So
e~^St = Probability of no mortgage prepayment occurring in any time 
interval St (conditional on no prior prepayment),
and
1 — e ^6t — Probability of a mortgage prepayment occurring in any time 
interval St (conditional on no prior prepayment).
This characteristic of the exponential distribution is often referred to as the 
“memoryless property” of the distribution; (see for example [44]). Stan-
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ton(1995) [54] relies heavily on this “memoryless property” result.
1.6 M BS Prepaym ent R ate C alculation
In practice the monthly conditional prepayment rate of an MBS pool, 
which is referred to as the single monthly mortality, (SMM), is calculated as:
_, , „ , total prepaymentsS M M  = ---------------------------------------------------------
outstanding principal at beginning of month
where:
total prepayments=opening monthly outstanding principal, less closing
monthly outstanding principal, less scheduled monthly repayments. 
Then the annualized conditional prepayment rate, (CPR), is given by:
(1.2) CPR  = 1 -  (1 -  S M M ) 12.
n(t ,v ,d)  is the continuous-time version of the SMM, (or CPR).
1.7 C onclusion
Concepts relating to mortgages, loan valuation, mortgage-backed securi­
ties, option pricing theory, and prepayment, have been brought together in 
this chapter as explanation, preparation and justification for the prepayment 
modelling research of the following chapters.
C h a p te r  2
V ariab le-R ate  P rep ay m en t 
M odel
2.1 In troduction
This chapter develops a variable-rate prepayment model which includes 
the necessary modifications for the characteristics unique to the Australian 
mortgage market. As was stated in chapter 1 a variable-rate mortgage, VRM, 
(in Australia), is a loan to a (home) borrower where the interest-rate on the 
loan varies according to the discretion of the lender. Competition amongst 
lenders ensures that this rate will be the short-term interest-rate, (referred 
to as the cash rate), established by the Reserve Bank of Australia, plus 
some margin rate which can vary from lender to lender. In the United 
States variable-rate mortgage interest-rates are adjusted according to indices. 
The differences between the Australia variable-rate mortgage and the United 
States adjustable-rate mortgage are discussed further in section 2.2 which is 
a literature review of the leading articles on variable-rate loan based MBS 
prepayment models. Section 2.3 discusses the essential difference between 
mortgage prepayments in the United States and mortgage prepayments in 
Australia-partial prepayments, and formulates appropriate variables. Sec­
tion 2.4 discusses an unrestricted prepayment model; a restricted or parsi­
monious version of this model is then proposed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 
presents an empirical evaluation of the unrestricted and restricted models of
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sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Section 2.7 contains some conclusions in 
relation to the variable-rate model.
2.2 V ariable-R ate Loan P repaym ent M odels- 
A L iterature R eview
Examples in the literature of research of variable-rate loan based mortgage- 
backed security prepayment modelling are rarer than examples on fixed-rate 
loan based mortgage-backed security prepayment modelling. This is not sur­
prising because in the US only a small percentage of securitized mortgages 
are adjustable-rate mortgages. (For example, as was stated in chapter 1, 
only 7.8% of securitized mortgages in the US were adjustable-rate mortgages 
between 1999 and 2001.) However the US MBS environment does include 
pools consisting exclusively of variable-rate loans; the models formulated in 
the research of McConnell and Singh and Sanyal are designed for such pools.
In the following two reviews (US) “adjustable-rate mortgage” , (ARM), is 
used synonomously with (Australian) “variable-rate mortgage” , (VRM).
2.2 .1  M cC onn ell and S ingh (1991)
In order to estimate a prepayment function McConnell and Singh classify 
individuals who prepay their variable-rate mortgages as falling into one of 
three categories:
1. Relocators
2. Refinancers
3. Switchers
[By comparison the Stanton(1995) model, designed to model prepayment 
of fixed-rate mortgages, has only relocator and refinancer prepayers. Stan- 
ton(1995) is reviewed in subsection 3.2.3. ]
Relocators. As was stated in “Categories of Prepayment” subsection of 
chapter 1, these mortgage holders are prepaying due to job relocation or
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changes to family circumstances. In prepayment modelling terminology this 
type of prepayment is referred to as exogeneous prepayment, that is pre­
payment unrelated to changes in interest-rates. There is a subtle difference 
between exogenous/relocator behaviour in fixed-rate based pools and exoge­
nous/relocator behaviour in variable-rate based pools. As is shown in the 
figure 2.1, Richard and Edens, [27, page 210], observe that
unlike fixed-rate mortgage pools where one plateau1 is reached 
and then prepayments level off, there are two plateaus observed 
for adjustable-rate mortgage pools, the first being at a higher 
CPR than the second which is reached about two years later.
This “two plateau” phenomenon is explained by the fact that fixed-rate loans 
embed a fixed-rate premium, (which increases as the length of the term in­
creases); thus individuals who are likely to sell their houses to relocate in 
the near future tend to select an adjustable-rate loan. Such prepayment be­
haviour is less expected to occur in Australia because such individuals can
lrThe “one plateau” pattern for exogeneous/relocator prepayment in fixed-rate based 
pools is depicted in figure 3.1 which shows PSA model prepayment rates.
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choose from available short-term fixed-rate mortgages. A second explanation 
of the “two-plateau” phenomenon is that ARM borrowers may be switching 
to fixed-rate mortgage, (FRM), contracts after expiration of the “teaser” 
or “initial term discount” period, based on expectations about interest-rate 
movements.
Refinancers. Before describing refinances some further background infor­
mation is necessary. Unlike Australian VRMs whose rates are reset almost 
immediately following a (Reserve Bank induced) rate change- for example 
the banks usually reset their interest-rates on mortgages within a week or 
two of an interest-rate change-the US VRMs are indexed to a rate such as 
a Treasury rate or a LIBOR rate and there is usually a lag of up to a year 
between index resets and the mortgage rate resets. On first impression of 
the relationship between RBA and bank mortgage rates in comparison to the 
US VRM the Australian VRM could be expected to behave almost as a pure 
floating-rate security.
If the index rate for the US VRM drops sharply during the interval be­
tween interest-rate reset dates, refinancers will choose to prepay their current 
VRM to take out another variable-rate loan linked to the new lower index 
rate. So their prepayment behaviour is similar to refinancers of FRMs.
These refinancers would not be expected to be present in Australian MBS 
pools if they consist only of VRMs because, as was stated above, (bank) mort­
gage rates are being continuously reset to the RBA rate. Why Australian 
VRMs do in fact exhibit refinancing behavior is revealed through the empiri­
cal investigations later in the present chapter. Also because Australian MBS 
pools can be expected to contain FRMs as well as VRMs the refinancing 
effect will need to be accounted for in the variable-rate model as described 
in sections 2.4 and 2.5.
Changes in the short-term interest-rate are used in McConnell and Singh’s 
model to capture the effects of refinancing on VRM-backed security prepay­
ments. McConnell and Singh hypothesize a negative correlation between 
prepayment and changes in the short-term interest-rate.
Refinancing by variable-rate mortgagors may also be affected by a burnout 
factor much as refinancers are in the case of fixed-rate loans. Richard and 
Roll [48] report that prepayments on fixed-rate loans are a function of the his-
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tory of interest-rates. They argue that fixed-rate mortgagors are differentially 
sensitive to declines in the rate on fixed-rate mortgages when making refi­
nancing decisions. The first time that the market coupon rate on fixed-rate 
mortgages falls below the coupon rate of an existing mortgage, for exam­
ple, the most sensitive mortgagors in a pool will refinance. That is, the most 
rate-sensitive fixed-rate mortgage refinancers will “burnout” of the pool. The 
second time that the pool is subject to a decline in the current market rate to 
this same level, prepayments will be lower than during the first interest-rate 
cycle. Only if the current rate on fixed-rate mortgages falls below its previ­
ous low will the next level of rate-sensitive fixed-rate refinancers be induced 
to refinance their loans. By extension a similar effect may be present with 
refinancers in VRM-backed securities, the difference being that the variable- 
rate mortgagors are responding to index changes rather than actual rates. 
McConnell and Singh include the history of the short-term rate to represent 
the burnout effect.
Switchers are individuals who prefer a fixed-rate loan, but, because of cir­
cumstances that they perceive as temporary at the outset of the loan, choose 
a VRM, with the expectation of switching to a fixed-rate loan when economic 
circumstances change.
McConnell and Singh state that
characterizing the prepayment behaviour of switchers is difficult 
because their initial choice depends upon their expectations re­
garding the future.
Fixed-rate loans smooth future cash outflows compared to variable-rate loans 
under which cash outflows are more variable. These “expectations regarding 
the future” could be determined by changes in both the relative and absolute 
level of interest-rates. Looking firstly at the absolute level of interest-rates 
effects:
• McConnell and Singh hypothesize that every time the fixed-rate loan 
rate falls to a new minimum, (in the time since pool origination), some 
of the switcher individuals will prepay (in order to switch to a fixed-rate 
loan).
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•  The rates on US-based variable-rate loans at origination consist of an 
index rate plus a margin over that index rate. The margin over the 
index rate is negotiable to some extent, higher margins often being 
traded off against lower origination fees or vice versa. McConnell and 
Singh hypothesize that the higher the margin at origination the more 
likely the borrower is to prepay in order to switch to a fixed-rate loan. 
McConnell and Singh use the long-term rate as a proxy for the fixed 
mortgage rate.
The final interest-rate determinant of switcher prepayment behaviour which 
McConnell and Singh examine is the change in the relative levels of the short 
and long term rates. McConnell and Singh assume that switchers view the 
long term rate as an unbiased predictor of the future short term rate to which 
their interest payments are indexed. Changes in the slope of the yield curve, 
that is changes in the spread between the long rate and short rate, is the 
variable used as an indicator of these relative changes.
McConnell and Singh suggest there should be a positive correlation be­
tween prepayments due to switching and changes in the slope of the yield 
curve-if the change in the slope of the yield curve is a reduction, switchers 
will expect low future short rates relative to previous levels and tend not to 
prepay, and vice versa. In Australian MBS pools switchers should only have a 
minor impact on prepayment behaviour since, as stated before, consistently 
90% of all Australian mortgages are variable-rate.
In the preceeding McConnell and Singh’s additional variable for variable- 
rate mortgages: “caps”, (which are ceilings on the amount of annual interest- 
rate adjustment and the level of lifetime interest-rate), has not been con­
sidered because there is no counterpart of this characteristic in Australian 
variable-rate mortgages.
Summarizing McConnell and Singh’s hypotheses (which are poten­
tially relevent to Australian variable-rate mortgages):
Because of relocators, prepayments on VRM-backed securities will be depen­
dent upon the season of the year and the length of time since origination of 
the pool; because of refinancers, prepayments will be negatively correlated 
with changes in the short-term interest-rate; because of switchers, prepay­
ments will be positively correlated with changes in the slope of the yield
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curve, and positively correlated with the level of the long-term rate rela­
tive to its level at the initiation of the pool; and because of the burnout 
of refinancers, prepayments will depend upon the history of the short-term 
interest-rate.
Estimation Procedure: McConnell and Singh follow the work of Schwartz 
and Torous [50], as in subsection 3.2.2, in using a proportional hazards model 
to estimate their prepayment function. As for Schwartz and Torous, equa­
tion (3.1):
(2.1) 7r(t, ß , v) = 7T0(t) exp{/3u},
is the functional form of their model. In equation (2.1) 7t0 (£ )  represents the 
function of time dependent variables component, (the relocator component), 
of the prepayment function, ß  the vector of parameter variables, and v is 
the vector of interest-rate variables.
McConnell and Singh Model Variable Definitions 
The McConnell and Singh model independent variables, (excluding those 
which do not apply to the Australian mortgage prepayment environment), 
are now described in more detail and then defined. The variables are catego­
rized according to the three categories of prepayers-relocators, refinancers, 
and switchers. 2 In the following let “r ” denote the short-term interest-rate, 
the long-term interest-rate, “k” the lag on interest-rates, and “q” the 
number of months since the last previous index (interest-rate), adjustment 
month. 3
• relocator variables:
Based on the assumption that relocators are more likely to move during the 
summer months , a seasonal indicator variable is defined as:
2The notation, rather than adhering strictly to that of McConnell and Singh, is influ­
enced by Sanyal’s notation and anticipates the notation which will be used in the Aus­
tralian variable-rate model.
3The lag, referred to here, between the mortgage holder’s decision to prepay and actual 
cash flows to the holder of a (variable-rate) MBS, occurs because: (i) for full prepayments, 
(refinancers and switchers), a new loan takes time for processing and approval, (it) there 
is a lag between the time of payment by the mortgage holder and the time that the 
corresponding payment is passed through to the investor. Hence changes in interest-rates 
are lagged relative to observed prepayments.
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1, if the month is a summer month,
SEASONAL= {  ’
1^0 for other months.
Based on the assumption that the quadratic form 7r0(t) =  &oT + &ir2 expresses 
the relationship between the average age of the pool and prepayment, (see 
“Sanyal” page 35 for more detail), the following transformed variable, r, is 
defined by:
t — AGEPOOLJ WAS * 100% if WAS < MAX{WAS} 
if WAS > MAX{WAS},
MAX { WAS }
1 100%
where “WAS”, (an acronym for “weighted average seasoning”), is the average 
age of the mortgages in the pool, weighted by the value of the mortgages, 
and where “MAXjWAS}” is the maximum WAS over all pools.
• refinancing variables:
McConnell and Singh use the relative change in the short-term interest- 
rate, (denoted by ASR), to capture the effect of refinancers on variable-rate 
MBS prepayments. ASR is defined by: ASR= •
The effect of burnout on refinancers in a pool is analyzed by observing the 
path traced by the short-term interest-rate. If the short-term interest-rate 
reaches a new minimum at any given time since the last previous index ad­
justment date, some additional mortgagors will be induced to refinance their
variable-rate loans. The burnout variable rNewMin is defined by
1, if the short-term interest-rate reaches a new minimum
in the previous 12 months,
0 otherwise.
[The McConnell and Singh burnout variable, as defined here, does not corre­
spond to the conventional burnout theory as outlined in Richard and Roll’s 
description on page 31, (or the “Factors Affecting Prepayment” section of 
chapter 1). Whereas a positive correlation is expected between McConnell 
and Singh’s burnout variable and CPR, a negative correlation is expected 
between conventional burnout variables and CPR].
• sw itcher variables:
The relative change in spread, over each month, between long and short­
term interest-rates is used as a proxy for changes in the slope of the yield 
curve. The variable is defined as: ASLYC=[/(t-fc)-r(t-/c)]-[/(t-fc-l)-r(t-fc-l)]. 
The effect on prepayment of switchers trying to predict future fixed-rates
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is captured by an indicator variable that traces the path of the long-term
rate since origination of the pool of mortgages. This variable is defined as:
ate reaches a new minimum
The most significant difference in approach between McConnell and Singh 
and Sanyal is in the model formula specification. Sanyal uses the linear re­
gression counterpart of the McConnell and Singh proportional hazards model 
as specified by equation (2.1). Thus the Sanyal model, (with only variables 
potentially relevent to Australia prepayment included), is specified as
CPR = ß0 + ßl AGE POOL + ß2SQR(AGEPL) + &WAC + ß4SE A SO N A L
The two variables WAC and ASR are different to McConnell and Singh’s 
model: the WAC is the weighted average coupon rate of the pool, and ASR 
is the change in the short-term rate rather than the relative change in short­
term rate as used by McConnell and Singh.
Sanyal [51] gives an explanation of the signs of the coefficients for the 
“function of time” , (or Age of Pool), independent variables. However Sanyal 
mistakenly refers to the component of the CPR which is a function of the Age 
of the Pool, (the baseline hazard function of McConnell and Singh’s propor­
tional hazards model), as “Age” [of Pool]. To avoid confusion the working is 
shown here:
As Sanyal states: “It is generally assumed that prepayment speeds in­
crease at a decreasing rate with pool age, in accordance with the well-known 
phenomenon of seasoning.” That is the component of the CPR which is a 
function of the Age of the Pool is assumed to have concave function form: 
positive first derivative with respect to Age of the Pool, and negative second 
derivative with respect to Age of the Pool. Hence, if we assume this com-
( 0 otherwise.
(NLM is an acronym for “New Long Minimum”.)
2.2 .2  Sanyal (1994)
( 2 .2 )
+&ASLYC1 + ßßASR + /37rNewMin + ß^NLM.
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ponent has quadratic form b0r  +  b\T2, where r  represents Age of the Pool, 
then
d d2
—  {60r  +  bXT2} = (b0 + 261r ) > 0 and —  {60t + b^r2} = 2fci < 0,
and hence the expected signs of the parameters are b0 > 0 and b\ < 0.
Sanyal’s theories regarding the prepayment variables generally agree with 
the theories of McConnell and Singh. However, in relation to the switcher 
variable ASLYC, although Sanyal agrees with McConnell and Singh theory 
that a steeper yield curve is typically regarded as an indication that future 
short rates will be higher, so that locking into a fixed-rate may seem attrac­
tive, he adds that as the yield curve steepens, fixed-rate mortgages become 
more expensive to switch into. He therefore proposes that the expected sign 
for the coefficient of the ASLYC could be positive or negative. Sanyal’s em­
pirical findings are that the coefficient is negative and significant; he therefore 
concludes that the rising cost of switching outweighs the incentive to switch 
in view of higher short-term rates.
2.3 Partial P repaym ent in A ustralia—M odel 
Variables
The essential difference between mortgage prepayments in the United 
States and mortgage prepayments in Australia is partial prepayments. Sec­
tion 2.3 is an investigation of partial prepayment in Australia including how 
and why there is this difference between partial prepayment behaviour of 
the United States and Australia. Thus section 2.3 establishes the theoretical 
foundations for modelling partial prepayment as is required for the variable- 
rate model. In order to model partial prepayment, the various reasons for 
partial prepayment are considered; these include:
• tax advantages
• partial prepayment by default
• aversion to debt and future interest-rate rises.
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2.3 .1  P a rtia l-P rep aym en t and Tax
The main underlying driving force which is responsible for the difference 
between US and Australian partial prepayment is that while interest pay­
ments on mortgages are tax deductible in the US, mortgage interest is not 
tax deductible in Australia. This difference creates the incentive for mort­
gage holders in Australia to partially prepay. Excess funds used to prepay 
mortgages effectively earn the mortgage rate as an after-tax interest-rate. In 
comparison the US mortgage holder effectively has an interest free loan and 
partial prepayment does not save interest payments. Australian mortgage 
holders will only be tempted to consider alternative investments, (such as 
shares or government bonds), for their excess funds, when the after-tax re­
turn on the alternative investments exceeds the current mortgage rate. The 
following (hypothetical) example is designed to illustrate how partial pre­
payments on “mortgages effectively earn the mortgage rate as an after-tax 
interest-rate” .
Example 2.3.1 P artial- P repayment  and T a x .
Let a mortgagor have a marginal rate of tax of 50%. To simplify let the 
mortgage rate equal the risk-free rate of 10%. The mortgagor might consider:
Option 1 Market Investment:
(i) Invest in Share Market,(RISKY):
Make assumptions on risk premium, say 5%. Hence:
Expected return on Market: 15.0% 
Marginal Tax Rate on return of 50%: 7.5% 
After Tax Return: 7.5%
(ii) Invest in Money Market(Goverment Loans),(NOT RISKY):
Return on Money Market: 10.0% 
Marginal Tax Rate on return of 50%: 5.0% 
After Tax Return: 5.0%
Option 2 Partial Prepayment (NOT RISKY):
Return on Mortgage(Opportunity Cost): 10.0% 
Marginal Tax Rate on Mortgage 0.0%: 0.0%
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After Tax Return: 10.0%
So the mortgagor’s best financial option, (given these assumptions), is partial 
prepayment.4 / /
From consideration of example 2.3.1 the variable ALTINV is defined:
(2.3) ALTINV — max f A a o a  * (1-Marginal Tax Rate) 
1 SVR
1,0
where R a o a  is the average continuous compounded return on the All Ordi­
naries Accumulation Index (over the previous twelve months), and “SVR” is 
the standard variable-rate; (see subsection 2.6.1.1 for further explanation of 
“SVR”).5
2.3 .2  D efau lt P artia l-P rep aym en t
The following quote from Westpac. Bank [59], explains why and how partial 
prepayment by default occurs.
...as interest-rates fall, borrowers have the option to reduce their 
loan repayments or maintain them at previous levels. If repay­
ments are left unchanged as rates fall, the difference between the 
old and new repayment level becomes partial prepayment instead 
of interest repayment. Of course not all borrowers will maintain 
repayment levels when interest-rates fall, however, on the whole 
we can expect this to have an impact, especially as the majority 
of mortgages in Australia are variable rate and attract little, if 
any penalties for early repayments.
4A comparable example for the US would have a return on mortgage, (opportunity 
cost) of 0.0%, for partial prepayment, so the US mortgagor is better off investing in shares 
or government bonds.
‘’Technical Note: Since the Australian marginal rate of tax was, over the sample data 
period, 42c for every $1 earned between $58,000 and $70,000, and 47c for every $1 earned 
over $70,000, the marginal rate of tax used in calculations, in the empirical investigations 
later in this chapter, was set, (somewhat arbitrarily), at 45%, (unlike example 2.3.1 where 
the marginal rate of tax is taken as 50%).
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To illustrate this point, consider the simple example of a $100,000 
loan with an annual interest-rate of 10%. Total interest payments 
for 1 year would be $10,000 initially but if interest-rates fall to 
9%, then this would fall to $9, 000. If the repayment was main­
tained at $10,000 however, the difference of $1,000 would be­
come [partial] prepayment. Based on this example a 1% decrease 
in interest-rates could be expected to see up to a 1% increase in 
[partial] prepayment rates.
Banks have adopted the practice of encouraging borrowers to maintain re 
payment levels in a falling interest-rate environment in the way described by 
the preceeding quote; the direct method of repayment of loans, which is the 
repayment method used for most loans, has facilitated this process.
From consideration of the preceeding quote the variable partial prepay­
ment by default, (denoted by ParDFLT), is defined:
(2.4) ParDFLT = max^jSVR} — current SVR,
where “max^” denotes the maximum mortgage interest-rate over the period 
from pool origination until the current month t. The “max^” in (2.4) is 
included to account for increases in rates after pool origination; that is the 
borrower paying by direct debit is assumed to increase repayments in response 
to rate increases as is contractually required, and maintain repayments at the 
new higher level (even if rates subsequently fall).
“pool origination” refers to that time when the average age of the mort­
gages in the pool is zero; calculation of this time is further discussed in 
subsubsection 2.6.1.4.
A positive correlation between ParDFLT and CPR will be expected.
2.3 .3  A version  to  Future R a te  R ises
The volatility variable, (VOLy), expresses the idea that the variable- 
rate mortgage holder’s aversion to (mortgage) debt increases as the risk of 
interest-rate rises increases, that is as interest-rate volatility increases. Mort­
gage holders will be expected to increase partial prepayments in response to
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increasing rate volatility. Hence:
(2.5) VOLy = volatility of SVR over previous 12 months.
Changes in the mortgage holders partial prepayment behaviour in response 
to rate volatility would best be tested over a long period, probably thirty 
years or more; the effect on mortgage holders of the high volatility (of rates) 
periods, (such as the early to mid nineteen nineties), could then be compared 
to low volatility periods. Unfortunately a sample data set spanning such a 
breadth of time was not available.
Similar arguments to those used to validate volatility as a partial prepay­
ment regressor variable could be used to validate the level of interest-rates 
as a partial prepayment regressor variable. There would also be similar data 
requirements for testing the latter variable.
Also considered, (but not implemented in empirical work), was a one­
sided risk-measure, since the mortgage holder is only worried about rate 
rises, not falls; an upper partial moment might be more appropriate.
2.3 .4  Sum m ary o f partia l prep aym en t in A u stra lia
The preceeding proposals for variables can be summarized by the following 
functional relationship:
( 2.6 )
CPR(for partial prepayment in Australia) =  f(ParDFLT,ALTINV,VOLy).
Model (2.6) is expected to comprise the essential core of the Australian pre­
payment model; the variables: ParDFLT, ALTINV, and VOLy are expected 
to explain Australian MBS prepayment. The next two sections further de­
scribe how model (2.6) is expected to contribute to an Australian prepayment 
model compared to literature-based models, (which have been mainly based 
in the U.S. mortgage market).
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2.4 U n restric ted  m odel (A U S )= augm ented  M /S
This section develops a form of the McConnell and Singh model adapted for 
Australian MBS pools. In order to model prepayment in Australia, to the 
three categories of prepayers of the McConnell and Singh model, a fourth 
category: partial prepayers, must be added. That is the Australian variable- 
rate model variables can be categorized as:
• time-dependent
• refinancing
• switching
• partial prepayment,
as in subsection 1.5.1. Both the time-dependent variables and the switcher 
variables are identical to the respective McConnell and Singh variables as 
in subsection 2.2.1. The partial prepayment variables are as specified in 
the previous section 2.3 by equations: (2.3), (2.4), and (2.5). However the 
refinancing variables will require further discussion.
As was stated in subsection 2.2.1 variable-rate mortgages in Australia op­
erate as pure floating rate securities; there is almost no lag between mortgage 
rates and market rates. However, (as was also stated in subsection 2.2.1), 
there are no purely variable-rate loan pools in Australia. (This assertion is 
based on the Reuters MBS pool data as described in subsubsection 2.6.1.2. 
There are however almost pure variable-rate loan pools; for example two of 
the twelve pools of mortgages in our Reuters data set are over 98% variable- 
rate loans at the beginning of the data period. [See table2.2.]) Since some 
of the loans in all mortgage pools within our data set are fixed-rate we need 
variables which capture the effects of fixed-rate loan refinancers on prepay­
ment.
• refinancing variables, (A ustralian  prepaym ent m odel):
The differential between pool origination coupon rate and the current mar­
ket mortgage rate is a commonly used variable to represent the refinancing
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incentive in fixed-rate mortgage pools in the United States. Hence FXDdifl 
is defined as:
FXDdifl = max{3yrFXD coupon rate at origination-current market 3yrFXD,0}
where “3yrFXD” is the three year fixed mortgage rate as described in sub­
section 2.6.1.1.
Two variables are used to represent burnout, (as described in subsec­
tion 1.5.2, “Factors Affecting Prepayment” in chapter 1, and also in the 
McConnell and Singh literature review; see page 34.) The first burnout vari­
able functions identically to rNewMin as in McConnell and Singh and Sanyal 
and will therefore be denoted as rNewMin. The differences between the Mc­
Connell and Singh/Sanyal version of rNewMin and r NewMin for the Australian 
prepayment model are (z) instead of r representing the short-term rate, r 
will represent the 3 year fixed mortgage rate, and (zz) the condition “over 
the previous 12 months”, becomes “[in the months] since origination of the 
pool” .
The second burnout variable,(denoted by BURNOUT), is designed to 
capture the effect of the reduction of the differential rate effect (on CPR), as 
the number of months, from the last increase in the rate differential, increases, 
(only when the rate differential is positive). Hence
A negative correlation between BURNOUT and CPR will be expected.
The augmented McConnell and Singh model for Australia prepayment 
data is now formed by applying McConnell and Singh’s model (2.1) or Sanyal’s 
model (2.2) to the variables as outlined in the present section. In equation
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form the augmented McConnell and Singh model can be stated as
(2.7)
CPR = f(AGEPOOL,SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLT,ALTINV,FXDdifl,
BURNOUT,VOLy, ASLYC, NLM,SEASONAL, N e w M i n
2.5 A R estr icted /P arsim on iou s A ustralian  P re­
paym ent M odel
The augmented McConnell and Singh model (2.7) is an unrestricted model 
which includes all potentially useful variables for the Australian mortgage 
prepayment environment. However the application of Occam’s razor implies 
that a model with fewer variables is preferred. Are all the variables of the aug­
mented McConnell and Singh model necessary? The switcher variables are 
both designed for borrowers switching to long-term fixed-rate loans. Because 
there are very few of this type of (fixed-rate) loan in Australia, NLM and 
ASLYC are probably redundant. When mortgage pools consist of mostly 
variable-rate loans the refinancer variables, (designed for fixed-rate loans), 
will be redundant. Taking into account the preceeding arguments, a parsi­
monious model, with functional form:
appears more likely to be appropriate for the Australian variable-rate mort­
gage prepayment environment.
( 2 .8)
CPR = f(AGEPOOL,SQR(AGEPL),SEASONAL,
ParDFLT,ALTINV,VOLy)
2.6 Em pirical E valuation
This section presents an empirical evaluation of the variable rate models as 
described in the previous sections.
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2.6.1 D a ta
Subsection 2.6.1 describes the interest-rate and mortgage-backed security 
data which is used to test the various models. Subsubsection 2.6.1.4 describes 
the decision of how the MBS pool data is divided into variable-rate mortgage 
pools, ( for testing the variable-rate model of sections 2.4 and 2.5), and fixed- 
rate mortgage pools, ( for testing the fixed-rate models of chapter 3).
2.6.1.1 Interest-Rate Data
The interest-rate data (over the period 1996 — 2003), was obtained from 
the RBA website, with address:
h t t p : //www. rba .gov .a u /S ta t is t ic s /B u lle tin /F 0 5 h is t .x ls 
The data obtained included:
• Three year fixed mortgage rates. (The notation “3yrFXD” will be used 
in formulae).
• Standard variable rate. (The notation “SVR” will be used in formulae).
• 10- year goverment bond, as proxy for the long-term interest-rate.
• 1-month T-bill, as proxy for the short-term interest-rate.
The latter two data items were used to calculate the ASLYC variable; (see 
page 34).
All Ordinaries Accumulation index data was also obtained from the RBA 
for the calculation of the ALTINV variable; (see equation 2.3).
2.6.1.2 Australian MBS Data
The MBS data, (which was obtained from Reuters via SIRCA), consists 
of twelve pools of data ranging over the period June 1998 to September 2003. 
An extract from a typical set of monthly records for a given pool is shown 
in table 2.1.
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Pool Performance as at 12-Jun-02
LVR INFORMATION BY LOAN BALANCE GEOGRAPHICS SEASONING
Below50% 16.42% < 50K 5.46% QLD (M) 35.69% < 1 YR 13.88%
50%-65% 15.27% 50K-100K 28.63% QLD (C) 35.69% 1 -2 YRS 41.08%
66%-75% 17.69% 100K-200K 52.49% VIC (M) 9.51% 2 -3 YRS 33.51%
76%-85% 22.81% 200K-300K 10.71% NSW (M) 9.11% 3 -4 YRS 11.54%
86%-90% 21.88% 300K-400K 2.16% OTHER 12.21% 4 -5 YRS 0.00%
90%-95% 5.93% 400K > 0.55% > 5 YRS 0.00%
BY OCCUPANCY MORTGAGE PRODUCT LOAN PURPOSE
OWNER 16.98% VARIABLE 34.21% PURCHASE 73.62%
INVESTOR 83.00% FIXED 65.79% REFINANCE 16.59%
OTHER 0.02% OTHER 9.79%
SUMMARY:
ISSUE CURRENT
NO. OF LOANS 4,911 4,711
AVE LOAN SIZE 133,693 132,502
WA LVR 70.81 70.02
WAS (MONTHS) 22.15 24.06
PREPAYMENT INFORMATION:
AT ISSUE CURRENT
C PR  N /A  30.47
SMM N /A  2.983
MORTGAGE POOL INFORMATION:
CURRENT MTH ISSUE TO DATE
OPEN BALANCE 
CLOSE BALANCE 
TOTAL PREPAYMENTS 
FULL PREPAYMENTS 
SUBSTITUTIONS
$ 488,136,385 N/A
$ 472,773,688 $ 472,773,688
$ 14,534,548 
$ 12,985,436
---------NO FACILITY---------
Table 2.1: A Typical Reuters Data Extract 
Terminology of table 2.1:
“WAS”, an acronym for “weighted average seasoning”, is the average age of 
the mortgages in the pool, weighted by the value of the mortgages. 
“WALVR”is an acronym for “weighted average loan to value ratio”; the 
“LVR” is the ratio of the loan value to the property value.
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2 .6 .1 .3  N otes on M BS data o f Table 2.1
(i) “Substitutions”, where mortgages are added to the pool when the pool 
would otherwise be reduced by prepayment, refinancing, or default, 
were avoided. Pools which showed substitutions were not used to source 
data because the theory of burnout will not necessarily apply for such 
pools. For example new loans, introduced to the pool by substitutions, 
might still prepay in response to a rate fall whether the rate fall is a 
new minimum or not.
(ii) There was no evidence in the Reuters data for “converting” of loans. 
(Converting from variable to fixed without fully prepaying, is a char­
acteristic of US ARM mortgages.) Hence this option was assumed not 
present in the data.
(iii) For a small percentage of the data, (approximately 3% — 4%), the 
value of CPRpuii6, the CPR of full prepayments, was greater than the 
value of CPR, (which includes both full and partial prepayments). In 
these cases the partial prepayments must be negative; the assump­
tion/explanation of this phenomenon is that in these months the mort­
gage holders are redrawing more than they are partially prepaying.
2 .6 .1 .4  F ixed  and Variable R ate  P oo ls
Columns one and two of table 2.2 show the percentage of fixed-rate loans 
at the beginning and end of the data period for the twelve pools; (the numbers 
in the brackets of column 1 are the respective beginning dates for the Reuters 
data of each pool, and the data for all pools ends at March 2003.) Column 
three shows the percentage fall in fixed-rate loans, (column 1— column 2), 
over the data period. The four pools corresponding to rows 2 — 5 were 
selected as “the fixed-rate pools” , (that is the pools of data on which the 
fixed-rate model of chapter 3, are tested), on the basis of the percentage of 
fixed-rate loans at the beginning of the data period. Clearly these are the 
only pools with over 50% of the loans being fixed. The remaining pools are
6See formulae (1.2) and (2.10).
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“the variable-rate pools” on which the variable-rate model of sections 2.4 and
2.5 are tested. [Using such a criterion (to categorize the pools into fixed and 
variable) may seem somewhat arbitrary since the fall in the percentage of 
fixed-rate loans might also have been used as a basis for categorization of the 
data, the presumption being that the fall is due to refinancing.] Figure 2.2 
shows the interest-rate environment to which the eight variable-rate pools are 
responding. The arrows from the circled numbers point to the respective pool 
approximate origination times, that is the times when the weighted average 
seasoning, (WAS), of the respective pools is approximately zero. (This time 
is calculated by subtracting the WAS at the beginning of the data for each 
pool from the corresponding historical month.)
2 .6 .1 .5  D escrip tive  S ta tistics, (variable-rate data)
Table 2.3 provides the descriptive statistics for the interest-rate, partial 
prepayment, and time variables only. The average CPR for the variable-rate 
data is approximately 27%.
2 .6 .1 .6  C orrelation  M atrix, (variable-rate data).
Table 2.4 provides the pairwise correlation matrix for the proposed interest- 
rate, partial prepayment and time variables, that is the independent vari­
ables, plus the regression dependent variable, the CPR.
There are strong correlations between the time variables: (AGEPOOL 
and SQR(AGEPL)), and the variables: ParDFLT and ALTINV. Another 
potential source of multi-collinearity is the strong correlation between ParD­
FLT and FXDdifl.7
7That ParDFLT and FXDdifl are highly correlated is not very surprising; for example, 
if the SVR and 3yrFXD rates are equal, (they are invaribly very close, as is clear from 
figure 2.2), and rates are monotonically decreasing, ParDFLT and FXDdifl are identical. 
However that is hypothetical since over the data period 1998 — 2003, the interest-rates 
were certainly not monotonically decreasing.
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F IX E D  % at: FIX E D  % at M a r/0 3 % C H A N G E
1.03(6/98) 5.86 -4 .8 3
55.41(7/98) 33.28 22.13
56.66(2/99) 47.84 8.82
70.25(12/98) 40.94 29.31
69.15(6/99) 54.91 14.24
25.13(9/99) 8.97 16.16
29.7(4/99) 14.36 15.34
1.73(10/98) 2.04 -0 .31
14.53(8/99) 10.83 3.7
33.14(7/00) 31.47 1.67
9.75(3/00) 11.88 -2 .1 3
12.21(3/00) 8.35 3.86
Table 2.2: C hange in Percentage o f F ixed -R ate  Loans in each pool.
V a r ia b le N o .O b s M e a n S td  D e v M in M e d ia n M a x
C PR 336 27.02426 7.486218 6.810000 27.07000 55.93000
ParD FL T 336 1.281845 1.260241 0.000 1.250000 4.450000
ALTINV 336 0.045704 0.129503 0.000 0.000 0.761522
FXDdifl 336 0.571875 0.961011 0.0000 0.100000 3.650000
NLM 336 0.023810 0.152683 0.000 0.0000 1.000
^ N e w M i n 336 0.107143 0.309756 0.000 0.000 1.000
SEASONAL 336 0.235119 0.424706 0.000 0.000 1.000
BU RN O U T 336 3.681548 4.383458 0.000 3.000000 25.000
VOLy 336 1.0836 0.666865 0.000 1.019358 2.167686
ASLYC 336 1.414494 1.428279 -1.660000 1.540000 3.710000
Table 2.3: Sum m ary sta tistics  o f th e  regression  variables, (variable- 
rate d ata ).
L e g e n d  o f  v a r ia b le s :
A G EPO O L is the relative weighted average age of m ortgages in the pool, (relative to  the 
highest weighted average age of m ortgages, (W AS), over all pools in the d a ta  set). 
SQ R(A G EPL) is A G EPO O L squared, ParD FL T  is partia l prepaym ent by default, NLM 
is new long m inim um , BURNOUT is burnout, SEASONAL is seasonality, ALTINV is 
a lternative investm ent, FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, VOLy is ra te  volatility, ASLYC 
is change in the slope of the yield curve. rNewMin is a new m inim um  in the 3 year fixed 
m ortgage rate ,
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Figure 2.2: Fixed/Variable Rates Environment. Arrows from the circled 
numbers point to the respective pool approximate origination dates
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2.6 .2  (variab le-rate data) R egressions
The regression modelling begins with the unrestricted variable-rate model (2.7), 
(which has been based largely on McConnell and Singh’s work). Equa­
tion (2.7) is repeated here for the reader’s convenience.
CPR -  f(AGEPOOL,SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLT,ALTINV,FXDdifl,
BURNOUT,VOLy, ASLYC, NLM,SEASONAL,rNewMin)
2.6.2.1 U nivariate  R egressions
The following variables were found to have significant effect on CPR at 
5% level (or better) in the univariate regressions:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLyl, ASLYC1, 
where the “1” suffixes denote the variables are lagged by one month. The 
variables SEASONAL, r NewMin, BURNOUT and NLM, (and variables derived 
from their lags), were either not significant or had incorrect signs (for the the­
ory); these variables were therefore eliminated from further regressions. The 
results for the univariate regressions are shown in table 2.5. The variables 
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL), and ParDFLTl have the highest t-statistics.
2.6 .2 .2  M u ltip le  R egressions
A regression of the seven variables from the significant univariate regres­
sions then formed a (revised) unrestricted model. The results for this regres­
sion are shown in column 1 of table 2.6. Applying the theory of section 2.5, 
a restricted model, with the variables of equation (2.8), (except for SEA­
SONAL, which was eliminated in the univariate regressions), is then tested 
as shown in column 2 of table 2.6. The restricted model of column 2 is 
the result of the hypothesis that variables FXDdifll and ASLYC 1, (from 
the (revised) unrestricted model), have coefficients jointly zero. To test this 
hypothesis a liklihood ratio test is conducted. The liklihood ratio statistic:
(2.9) LRS = -2(RLLF-ULLF),
52
E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A d ju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.2031
(10.5553)
0.0000 0.2479
SQR(AGEPL) ± 0.1908
(9.4859)
0.0000 0.2099
ParDFLT 1 + 2.8136
(9.8286)
0.0000 0.2236
ALTINV -1.4761
(-3.7497)
0.0002 0.0375
FXDdifll + 2.2425
(5.4935)
0.0000 0.0824
BURNOUT1 0.2920
(3.1710)
0.0017 0.0263
VOLyl + 2.0622
(3.4153)
0.0007 0.0309
ASLYC 1 ± 0.8820
(3.1196)
0.0020 0.0254
SEASONAL1 + -2.5200
(-2.7832)
0.0056 0.0173
V1 N e w M i n + 0.3257
(0.2432)
0.8080 -0.0028
NLM1 + -5.4694
(-2.0515)
0.0410 0.0095
Table 2.5: U nivariate R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ic s , p-values  
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R  as depend en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant). 
Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without AGE- 
POOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate.
Legend o f variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifi is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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follows a chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of additional parameters in the (revised) unrestricted model. In 
(2.9) RLLF is the log-liklihood function of the restricted model and ULLF 
is the log-liklihood function of the unrestricted model. From column 2 of 
table 2.6 the liklihood ratio statistic is
LRS(xi) = —2( —1090.492 -  (-1088.236))
= 4.512658
The p-value for H0, the hypothesis that the coefficients of proposed redundant 
variables FXDdifll and ASLYCl are jointly zero, is 0.104734. Therefore H0 
is not rejected.
The t-statistic values for ALTINV and VOLyl in the restricted model, ( 
—0.0432 and —1.4236 respectively), indicate that these variables also may be 
redundant. Column 3 of table 2.6 shows the results of a “best (restricted) 
model” formed by the hypothesis that all coefficients of all variables except 
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL) and ParDFLTl of the revised unrestricted model 
are equal to zero. A second liklihood ratio test is conducted. From table 2.6 
column 3 the liklihood ratio statistic is
LRS(*2) = —2(—1091.529 -  (-1088.236))
= 6.586681
The p-value for H0, the hypothesis that all coefficients of all proposed redun­
dant variables, ALTINV, FXDdifll, VOLyl, and ASLYCl are equal to zero, 
is 0.15941. Therefore H0 is not rejected. Each of the variables AGEPOOL, 
SQR(AGEPL), ParDFLTl are significant at 1% level and the coefficient signs 
are in accord with the theory of the model as described in sections 2.2 and 
2.3 .
The variable FXDdifll was the next best choice of the remaining variables. 
FXDdifll was significant at 1% level and of correct sign when included in the 
model without ParDFLTl, (that is, with CPR as dependent variable, and 
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL), FXDdifll as regressors), though the adjusted 
R2 was slightly lower at 0.275031 compared to 0.298709 with ParDFLTl. 
With both ParDFLTland FXDdifll in the model the sign of FXDdifll’s co­
efficient becomes negative due to the multi-collinearity between ParDFLTl
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and FXDdifl, (correlation(ParDFLTl,FXDdifl)=0.849569).
2.6 .2 .3  N otes on R egressions
(i) Although pool variables such as: WALVR, Refinancing Percentage, In­
vestor Percentage, Number of Loans, Average Loan Size, and Geo­
graphic Loacations were also considered tested, they were not found to 
have a significant effect on CPR.
(ii) The McConnell and Singh model has form as shown in equation (2.1). 
Their model was tested; however the results obtained were so close 
to the results obtained from the (Sanyal) linear counterpart of equa­
tion (2.1) that only the results of the preceeding sections needed pre­
senting.
(iii) There was no consistency for lags; the optimal lag on interest-rate and 
partial prepayment variables varied from no lag to three lags though 
most were optimal with either one or two lags, with results for lag one 
and lag two being very close. Lag one was chosen in preference to lag 
two in such cases.
Using the Reuters data items “Open Balance” , “Total Prepayments”, 
and “Full Prepayments” , (as shown in table 2.1), the following formulae, 
adapted from the CPR/SMM formula 1.2, provided data items CPRpartiai 
and CPRpuii.
2.6 .3  CPRpartiai and C P R fuII
( 2. 10)
( 2. 11)
Table 2.7 provides the descriptive statistics for CPRpartiai, CPRpuii and the 
ratio of CPRpartiai to CPRpuii. Evidently partial prepayments are usually
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(R ev ised )1 B est-
U nrestr icted - R estricted - (R estricted )
M odel M odel M odel
C olum n 1 C olum n 2 C olum n 3
D ep en d en t Variable:
C P R C P R C P R
No. of Obs 336 336 336
Independ en t Variables:
Constant 12.08488 12.4622 13.82566
(4.290840) (5.1328) (7.017232)
AGEPOOL 0.426116 0.4698 7.017232
(3.200806) (4.1741) (4.238887)
SQR(AGEPL) -0.282079 -0.3306 -0.242452
(-2.307838) (-3.0792) (-2.789269)
ParDFLT 1 2.143346 1.4337 1.540579
(2.429146) (3.9014) (4.317186)
ALTINV 0.348102 -0.0423
(0.739369) (-0.0432)
FXDdifll -1.158727
(-1.203356)
VOLyl -0.874345 -0.99624
(-1.267886) (-1.4236)
ASLYC1 0.249342
Log-Likelihood
( 0.798438)
-1 0 8 8 .2 3 6 -1 0 9 0 .4 9 2 -1 0 9 1 .5 2 9
Likelihood Ratio Statistic 4.5126 6.586681
p-val 0.104734 0.159410
BIC 6.616095 6.5949 6.566447
adjusted R2 0.3039 0.2988 0.2987
Table 2.6: M u ltip le  R egression  C oefficients and t-sta tist ics
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have been elimi­
nated” .
L eg en d  o f  variab les:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum, SEASONAL is seasonality, 
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
BURNOUT is burnout, VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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Variable No.Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CPR-Partial 336 6.355 3.886 -3.587 6.016 24.013
CP Rpuii 336 22.087 7.891 5.269 22.128 58.383
CP Rpartial/CP RpuU 336 33.911 26.852 -28.783 30.087 205.521
Table 2.7: Summary statistics for CPRpartiai, CPRpuii, and their 
ratio.
approximately one third of full prepayments. Figure 2.3 shows how the ratio 
of CPRpartiai to CPRpuiiis varying over the respective data periods of the 
eight variable-rate pools. Regressions of the eleven independent variables (of 
the unrestricted model of section 2.4), on these two components of the (total) 
CPR gives more information about how these variables are affecting CPR.
2.6.3.1 CPRpartiai as dependent variable, (variable-rate data)
Partial prepayment theory has only been developed for the variables 
ParDFLT, ALTINV, and VOLy, (in section 2.3); hence the expected signs of 
the coefficients of all other variables as regressors for CPRpartiai, are indeter­
minate.
Univariate Regressions:
The univariate regressions with CPRpartiai as dependent variable, (see ta­
ble 2.8), find that only the variable ParDFLTl is significant at 5% level and 
to have correct sign. Though having no theory for partial prepayment, the 
FXDdifl variable is significant at 10% level.
That FXDdifl variable is significant at 10% level might be taken as a 
weak sign that partial prepayment is not exclusive to variable-rate mortgage 
holders. A positive relationship between partial prepayment and FXDdifl 
is, on first impression, difficult to comprehend. If market mortgage rates 
are lower than fixed-rate borrowers’ rates, (when FXDdifl is larger), their 
anxieties about having to pay higher rates in the near future, (when their 
fixed-term expires and their rates are reset to the current market rate), should 
be less. However possibly any rate changes are, to fixed-rate borrowers, a 
reminder of the volatility of interest-rates, and hence a warning that in a few 
years time they may be paying higher rates; hence their reaction of partial
57
o 100
300 ♦
Observation Number (t~i jfc)
♦  partial/full j
Figure 2.3: R a tio  C P R p a r t iai to  CPRFuiifor the  eight variab le -ra te
pools.
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E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta t is t ic p-value
A dju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL ~ ± r ~ -0.010259
(-0.890169)
0.3740 -0.000620
SQR(AGEPL) i 1 -0.015192
(-1.294980)
0.1962 0.002017
ParDFLT 1 + 0.370654
(2.213088)
0.0276 0.011501
ALTINV 0.090960
(0.055405)
0.9558 -0.002985
FXDdifl i 1 0.383523
(1.743978)
0.0821 0.006057
^ N e w M i n  1 i 1 0.910823 
(1.330506 )
0.1843 0.002294
BURNOUT i 1 0.040261
(0.843105)
0.3998 -0.000864
VOLy + 0.085661
(0.265830)
0.7905 -0.002782
ASLYC i 1 0.084534
(0.564750)
0.5726 -0.002037
NLM i 1 0.230080
(0.143532)
0.8860 -0.002932
SEASONAL i 1 -0.401652
(-0.803104)
0.4225 -0.001061
Table 2.8: U nivariate R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values  
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R Partiai as depend en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Partial prepayment theory has only been developed for the variables ParDFLT, ALTINV, 
and VOLy, (in section 2.3). Hence the expected signs of the coefficients of all other 
variables as regressors for C P R p artiah  are indeterminate.
Legend o f variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, BURNOUT is burnout,
NLM is new long minimum, VOLy is rate volatility, 
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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prepayment.
M u ltip le  R egressions:
Column 1, with heading “(Revised) unrestricted model” in table 2.9, shows 
the results for a regression with the two variables ParDFLTl and FXDdifl as 
independent variables. The sign of the coefficient of FXDdifl has changed to 
negative, presumably due to multi-collinearity with the ParDFLTl variable; 
(correlation(ParDFLTl,FXDdifl)=0.849569 from table 2.4).
Column 2, ( “Best (restricted) model”), of table 2.9, shows the results for 
a liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the variable FXDdifl is redundant 
to the model of column 1. From column 2 the liklihood ratio statistic is:
LRS(x?) = -2 (-929 .8623 - (-929.8435))
= 0.037765,
with corresponding p-value 0.845916. Hence the hypothesis that FXDdifl is 
redundant cannot be rejected.
In this “best (restricted) model” ParDFLTl is significant at 5% level and 
of correct sign. Although the significance level of the best model overall 
is low, (adjusted R2=0.011501), both this value and the BIC, (5.569520), 
confirm that the best model is an improvement on the unrestricted model 
with adjusted R2= 0.008644 and BIC=5.586721.
Neither of our other two partial prepayment variables, (the ratio of av­
erage after-tax share market returns to mortgage rates, and the volatility of 
mortgage rates), as proposed in section 2.3, showed a significant impact on 
variable-rate mortgage holders’ partial prepayment.
2 .6 . 3 . 2 CPRpun as depend en t variable, (variable-rate data)
Because the partial prepayment variables have no theory for full prepay­
ment the expected sign of their coefficients is prima facie indeterminate when 
CPRpun is the dependent variable. For this reason ParDFLTl, ALTINV and 
VOLy variables have an indeterminate expected sign in the univariate regres­
sions (in table 2.10).
U nivariate R egressions:
Taking into account the preceeding notes regarding expected signs of co-
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(R e v ised )1
U n- B est
restr icted (restricted)
M odel M odel
C olum n 1 C olum n 2
D ep en d en t Variable:
C P R p a r t i a i C P R p a r t i a i
No. of Obs
Independ en t Variables:
336 336
Constant 5.860990 5.879847
(18.50913) (19.54441)
ParD FLTl 0.420482 0.370654
(1.368093) (2.213088)
FXDdifl -0.077862
(-0.193468)
Log-Likelihood -9 2 9 .8 4 3 5 -9 2 9 .8 6 2 3
Liklihood Ratio Statistic 0.037765
p-value 0.845916
BIC 5.586721 5.569520
adjusted R2 0.008644 0.011501
Table 2.9: M ultip le R egression  C oefficients and t-s ta tis t ic s  for
CPRpartiai, (variable-rate data).
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated” .
L egend  o f  variables:
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
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efficients the univariate regressions with CPRpuii as dependent variable, (see 
table 2.10), select the same seven significant at 5% level and correct sign vari­
ables as the univariate regressions with (total) CPR as dependent variable; 
namely:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOIA1, ASLYCl.
That all three proposed partial prepayment variables, ParDFLTl, ALT­
INV and VOLyl, are significant for full prepayments is noteworthy.
The significance of ASLYCl presumably shows evidence of switching 
from variable-rate to fixed-rate. The positive sign for the coefficient of 
ASLYCl agrees with the empirical findings of McConnell and Singh rather 
than Sanyal; (see page 36 for the relevent discussion).
M u ltip le  R egressions:
The seven variables:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLyl, ASLYCl, 
selected by the univariate regressions become the variables for the (revised) 
unrestricted model as shown in column 1 of table 2.11. Given that these 
variables are the same seven variables for the (revised) unrestricted model 
of the “(total) CPR as dependent variable” regressions, (with the exception 
of the lag on the FXDdifl variable), the same progression of liklihood ratio 
tests might be possible. Following this idea, the restricted model of column 
2 table 2.11, is the result of testing the hypothesis that variables FXDdifll 
and ASLYCl have coefficients jointly zero. The liklihood ratio statistic for 
the test is given by
LRS(x2) = —2(—1116.391 -  (-1114.473))
= 3.837924
The p-value for H0, the hypothesis that the coefficients of proposed redundant 
variables FXDdifll and ASLYCl are jointly zero, is 0.146759. Therefore Hq 
is not rejected.
The variables which were next tested for redundancy in the “(total) CPR 
as dependent variable” regressions, were ALTINV and VOLyl. From column 
2 of table 2.11, the t-statistics for ALTINV and VOLyl are respectively: 
—0.956808 and —0.637013, with corresponding p-values: 0.3394 and 0.5246. 
Clearly these variables should next be tested for redundancy. From table 2.11
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column 3 the liklihood ratio statistic is
LRS(*2) = —2( —1116.974 -  (-1114.473))
= 5.003108
The p-value for H0, the hypothesis that all coefficients of all proposed re­
dundant variables, ALTINV, FXDdifll, VOLyl, and ASLYC1 are equal to 
zero, is 0.286979. Therefore H0 is not rejected. As for the “(total) CPR as 
dependent variable” regressions, these eliminations leave the variables AGE- 
POOL, SQR(AGEPL) and ParDFLTl; (see column 3 table 2.11). However, 
unlike the “(total) CPR as dependent variable” regressions, SQR(AGEPL) is 
not significant; SQR(AGEPL) has t-statistic —1.404415 with corresponding 
p-value 0.1611. Hence SQR(AGEPL) is next tested for redundancy.
Column 4 table 2.11 shows the results of a liklihood ratio test of the 
hypothesis that variables SQR(AGEPL), ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLyl, and 
ASLYCl are redundant to the model of column 1. The liklihood ratio statis­
tic is given by
LRS(xs) = —2(—1117.969 -  (-1114.473))
= 6.993346
The p-value for the hypothesis that all five variables are redundant is 0.221136. 
Hence the hypothesis is not rejected. The resulting “best (restricted) model” 
of column 4 includes variables AGEPOOL and ParDFLTl with p-values 
0.0000 and 0.0152 respectively.
On the basis of the adjusted R2s, there is very little difference between 
the explanatory power of the respective models in table 2.11. However the 
Bayesian Information Criterion does show a reduction in value, (that is an 
improvement in explanatory power), as the models progress from unrestricted 
to “best (restricted) model”.
2.6 .3 .3  ParD FLT Variable R eview ed
The result ParDFLTl having strong significance in relation to explaining 
the variation in CPRpuii, is inconsistent with our theory of subsection 2.3.2, 
(Default Partial Prepayment), which proposed ParDFLT as a partial pre-
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E xp ected
In d ep en d en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A dju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.216141
(10.68473)
0.0000 0.252505
SQR(AGEPL) i 1 0.208846
(9.958249)
0.0000 0.226626
ParD FLTl ± 2 2.593517
(8.316834)
0.0000 0.169084
ALTINV ± 2 -11.99425
(-3.669267)
0.0003 0.035870
FXDdifl + 1.993362
(4.580650)
0.0000 0.056291
^ N e w M i n  1 + -0.733718 
( -0.526591)
0.5988 -0.002162
BURNOUT1 0.252160 
(2.585474 )
0.0101 0.016686
VOLyl ± 2 2.346184
(3.697038)
0.0003 0.036437
ASLYC 1 ± 0.872152
(2.921662)
0.0037 0.022001
NLM1 + -4.560110
(-1.404882)
0.1610 0.002898
SEASONAL + -1.728985
(-1.708097)
0.0885 0.005692
Table 2.10: U n ivariate  R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R fuII as d ep en d en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
 ^ Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without 
AGEPOOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate.
 ^ The expected signs of the partial prepayment variables, (with CPRpuii as dependent 
variable), are discussed on page 59.
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, VOLy is rate volatility,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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(R ev ised )1
Un- B est
restricted R estricted R estricted (R estricted)
M odel M odel M odel M odel
Colum n 1 C olum n 2 Colum n 3 Colum n 4
D epend en t Variable:
C P R fuII C P R p u i i C P R fuII C P R p u i i
No. of O bs
Independent
Variables:
336 336 336 336
C o n s ta n t 9.635591 9.860966 9.925397 12.49372
(3.512665) (4.067029) (4.670235) (11.52214)
A G E P O O L 0.320087 0.335559 0.300318 0.174448
(2.413582) (2.759425) 3.215028 (6.616995)
S Q R (A G E P L ) -0.159164 -0.167117 -0.131680
(-1.301417) (-1.454507) (-1.404415)
P a rD F L T  1 1.113415 0.922059 0.945721 0.940813
(1.259093) (2.337623) (2.456919) 2.440707
V O Ly l -0.336575 -0.485149
(-0.440806) (-0.637013)
A LTIN V -3.646505 -2.948770
(-1.166233) (-0.956808)
FX D difl -0.412077
(-0.433504)
A SLY C1 0.439982
(1.325612)
L og-L ikelihood -1 1 1 4 .4 7 3 -1 1 1 6 .3 9 1 -1 1 1 6 .9 7 4 -1 1 1 7 .9 6 9
L.R .S . 2 3.837924 5.003108 6.993346
p-value 0.146759 0.286979 0.221136
BIC 6.772268 6.749064 6.717907 6.706517
a d ju s te d  R 2 0.267612 0.263688 0.265581 0.263437
Table 2.11: M ultip le  R egression  C oefficients and t-sta tistics  for
C P R fuII? (variable-rate data).
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated”.
2 “L.R.S.” denotes “Liklihood Ratio Statistic”.
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, VOLy is rate volatility,
NLM is new long minimum,
vNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality, BURNOUT is burnout,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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payment variable only. As is evident from equation (2.4) (which defines 
ParDFLT), the ParDFLT variable is calculated from the variable-rate, not 
the fixed-rate. Full prepayments by variable-rate borrowers, (which the re­
gression results imply are occuring to a significant extent), can be explained 
as evidence of (i) variable-rate refinancing, or (ii) switching from variable- 
rate to fixed-rate loans. Each of these possibilities is now considered.
(i) variable-rate refinancing:
One of the assumptions implicit in our theory prior to empirical testing, has 
been that there is not enough difference between variable-rate lender rates 
to make a variable-rate borrower fully prepay their existing loan in order to 
take out another lower-rate variable-rate loan. That is wre have made the as­
sumption that there is no refinancing from variable-rate loan to variable-rate 
loan. There was some evidence in the literature of variable-rate refinancing 
which we chose to regard as unimportant. For example Westpac bank [60], 
states:
A bigger impact of falling interest-rates [than partial prepay­
ments], is the associated potential increase in full prepayments 
via refinancing. Changing interest-rate environments tend to cre­
ate differences between competing lenders rates and so tend to 
act as a trigger for borrowers to reassess their debt position. As 
loan products have become readily available with lower entry and 
exit costs, borrowers have become increasingly sophisticated and 
refinancing has become more and more commonplace. Borrow­
ers quickly take the opportunity to swap to improved products 
or cheaper rates when differentials arise leading to an increase in 
full prepayments.
ParDFLT is a measure of the differential rate between rates of a (variable- 
rate) borrower repaying by direct debit and the current market variable-rate. 
In review the possibility that some variable-rate borrowers find refinancing 
to another more competitive variable-rate loan clearly cannot be excluded.
(ii) sw itch ing  from  variable-rate to  fixed-rate loans:
The non-significance of NLM and ASLYC implies that switching from variable- 
rate loans to long-term fixed-rate loans is not occurring to any significant ex­
tent. However there is no evidence to contradict the possibility that the full
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prepayments by variable-rate borrowers in response to variable-rate move­
ments, are switches to short-term fixed-rate loans. In the preceeding para­
graphs which deal with variable-rate refinancing we stated that “ ParDFLT is 
a measure of the differential rate between rates of a (variable-rate) borrower 
repaying by direct debit and the current market variable-rate.” Similarly 
because short-term fixed-rates are closely related to the variable-rate, ( Cor­
relation^ VR, 3yrFixed}= 0.716008 over 1997 — 2003 and see figure 2.2), 
ParDFLT is also a measure of the differential rate between the rates of the 
variable-rate borrower repaying by direct debit and current short-term fixed- 
rates. Thus ParDFLT is also a possible explanation of why variable-rate 
borrowers might switch to short-term fixed-rate loans.
In conclusion (of this subsection reviewing ParDFLT), we have to remain 
open about whether these full prepayments of variable-rate loans are just 
refinancings to other variable-rate loans, or just switches to short-term fixed- 
rate loans, or some combination of these two modes of full prepayment.
Whereas previously all variables have represented only one type of pre­
payer exclusively, now we have a variable which could possibly be representing 
three types of prepayers. ParDFLT possibly simultaneously represents:
(i) partial prepayers,
(ii) refinances, (variable-rate to variable-rate),
(iii) switchers, (variable-rate to short-term fixed-rate).
Our aim, of creating a model which is as parsimonious as possible, is well 
served by the multi-faceted nature of the variable ParDFLT.
The preceeding discussion might be regarded as an argument which im­
plies that the name “ParDFLT” is no longer appropriate for this variable, 
which is now recognized as not just a partial prepayment (by default) vari­
able. However, we will leave the name unchanged for the present, pending 
further tests on the fixed-rate and combined data of chapters 3 and 4.
2.6 .3 .4  R egarding M odels w ith ou t SQ R (A G E P L )
The final model in table 2.11 is an example of a linear models which 
omits SQR(AGEPL), in the search for parsimony; this type of model has
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the disadvantage that the concave structure of the exogeneous prepayment, 
(as explained on page 35), is being sacrificed. When AGEPOOL is included 
in these simpler models they wrongly suggest that exogeneous prepayment 
increases indefinitely as the pool matures.
2.7 C o n c lu d in g  R em ark s
The most noteworthy result of the chapter is how well the restricted pre­
payment model:
(2.12) CPR = f( AGEPOOL,SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLT),
performs relative to the unrestricted model (2.7).
The ParDFLT variable, (representing the amount by which the mortgage 
holder’s highest interest-rate level attained over the prior course of the loan, 
exceeds the current market mortgage variable-rate), was found to have a 
highly significant effect on both partial prepayments and full prepayments 
for the variable-rate mortgage holder.
The ALTINV variable, (representing the ratio of average after-tax share 
market returns to mortgage rates), was found to have a high negative asso­
ciation with variable-rate mortgage holder full prepayments.
Other univariately significant and correct sign interest-rate variables, for 
full prepayments of variable-rate mortgage holders, were FXDdifl, VOLyl, 
and ASLYC1.
The empirical tests of our variable-rate model(s) have revealed that our 
variables explain full prepayment much more effectively than partial prepay­
ment. In particular the relatively low adjusted R2’s, (0.008644 and 0.011501 
for the unrestricted and restricted models respectively, (with CPRpartiai as 
dependent variable as in table 2.9)), show that partial prepayment cannot 
be very well explained by linear regression models with only interest-rate 
and time-dependent variables as the independent variables. The correspond­
ing adjusted R2s for the unrestricted and restricted models with CPRpuii as 
dependent variable, were 0.267612 and 0.263437, (as shown in table 2.11).
C h a p te r  3
F ix e d -R a te  P re p a y m e n t M o d e l
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 focuses on modelling fixed-rate prepayment. As was stated in 
chapter 1 a fixed-rate mortgage is a loan where the interest-rate on the loan is 
fixed. While in the United States the interest-rate on a fixed-rate mortgage 
is fixed for the entire loan period, (usually 25 — 30 years), in Australia the 
interest-rate is fixed for sub-periods, (1 ,2 ,3 ,... ,15 years), of the full loan 
term period, which is usually 25 years. Loans with a fixed term longer than 
5 years are very rare in Australia.
The present chapter continues the fixed-rate prepayment topics “cate­
gories of prepayment” , “factors affecting prepayment”, and “the prepayment 
function as a particular case of a hazard function”, as introduced in chapter 1. 
The chapter opens with a literature review of fixed-rate prepayment models, 
focusing on three models: the Public Securities Association, (PSA), model, 
Schwartz and Torous, (1989) [50], and Stanton(1995) [54]. The first model 
is an example of a prepayment model based purely on the “time factor”. 
Arguments for why such models are inadequate are presented. Schwartz and 
Torous’ (1989) paper is one of the leading prepayment modelling papers; 
McConnell and Singh, (1991), (and hence indirectly Sanyal, (1994)), Sher­
ris, Ang, and Stanton(1995), all acknowledge the influence of Schwartz and 
Torous (on their prepayment modelling). Section 3.3 is an empirical evalua­
tion of linear (variable-rate) models, (as specified in chapter 2), now applied
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to the fixed-rate data. Section 3.4 is an empirical evaluation of the Stanton 
model in the Australian mortgage industry context. Section 3.5 contains 
chapter conclusions.
3.2 L iterature R eview  o f F ixed -R ate Loan P re­
paym ent M odelling
3.2.1 The PSA M odel
The Public Securities Association, (PSA), (now called the Bond Mar­
ket Association,(BMA)), proposed a prepayment model which has become a 
common benchmark or industry standard for the prepayment rate.
The CPR, (Conditional Prepayment Rate), which measures the annual 
prepayment rate will be used to describe the PSA model. The PSA model 
assumes a series of CPRs that begin at 2% per annum in the first month, 
and rise at 0.2% each month for a period of 30 months. At the end of this 
ageing period the pool’s CPR has reached 6%. Thereafter the prepayment 
rate is assumed to remain constant until the maturity of the mortgage pool 
is reached. This is a 100% PSA. A 200% PSA denotes a prepayment rate 
which is double that of a 100% PSA at each point in time. See figure 3.1, 
which is taken from the FANMAC 1 Handbook. Obviously the models’ great­
est weakness is that the effect of the market mortgage interest-rate changes 
on the prepayment rate is ignored; interest-rate effects on prepayment are 
assumed to stay at a constant level. FANMAC used the PSA rate method 
in their Private Placement Memorandum, (1991), for investors. They pro­
vided a pro forma prepayment schedule for the MBSs which “assumes that 
the Homefund Low Start Home Loans will prepay at 175% PSA and that 
the Home Fund Affordable Home Loans will prepay at 100% PSA”. Both 
Ang(1995) [3] and the National Australia Bank [45] document the massive 
losses to investors in FANMAC MBSs in the early 1990’s. Ang(1995) states:
2(As was stated in chapter 1), FANMAC, (First Australian National Mortgage Accep­
tance Co. Ltd.), was 25% NSW government owned and Australia’s largest MBS issuer 
in the 1980s and 1990s. FANMAC was privatised in approximately the year 2000, and is 
now named “RESIMAC”.
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Prepayment
rate(%)
200% PSA
175% PSA
100% PSA
50% PSA
Months Since Origination
Figure 3.1: PSA Prepayment Rates.
The shortcoming of the PSA is that it only models prepayment 
rates on the length of time a mortgage has been in the pool; that 
is it presumes CPRs are maturity dependent. It does not allow 
the CPR to depend on the economic conditions which influence 
prepayment, for example current interest-rates affecting the refi­
nancing abilities of mortgagors. For most MBS issues, especially 
FANMACs, the amount of prepayments dependent on interest- 
rate factors is very important and is not captured by a standard 
PSA model.
Speculation arises as to how likely the use of this model was responsible for 
the alienation of MBS investors and the subsequent discontinuation of the 
fixed-rate pass-through MBS in Australia.
3.2 .2  Schw artz and T orous(1989)
In purely “empirical models” , prepayments are specified as a function 
of a set of exogeneous explanatory variables, and the model is estimated 
using past rates of prepayment on other mortgage pools (during different
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interest-rate and economic environments). Schwartz and Torous [50] adopt 
this approach. The four prepayment influencing factors, as described in 
section 1.5.2, are the explanatory variables. The interest-rate factor is rep­
resented in two ways:
• firstly as the differential between the existing mortgage contract rate 
and the (lagged) market mortgage rate:
Vi(t) = c — l(t — s), s > 0;
• secondly as the cube of the former variable:
Mt)  = MO]3-
Burnout is defined as
v3(t) = In (AOt/Ao;),
where uAOt represents the dollar amount of the pool outstanding at time 
£, while AOl is the pool’s principal which would prevail at t in the absence 
of prepayments but reflecting the amortisation of the underlying mortgages. 
The greater the amount previously prepaid, and hence the smaller v3(t) is, 
the less likely are further prepayments across all (remaining) mortgage ages.”
The time factor is represented by the base-line hazard function tt0 (t, 7, p). 
Schwartz and Torous choose as their base-line hazard function:
_  7P(7PP~1 *.
7’^  1 + (7 t)p '
this is a log-logistic hazard function, [“t” here is a measure of the age of 
the mortgages in the MBS pool; 7 and p are constants (which are to be 
estimated).]
Finally, seasonality, n4(t), is defined as
v4(t) =
1 if t £ summer or spring,
0 otherwise.
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These factors combine into a proportional-hazards prepayment model:
(3.1) 7T(t,v,0) = 7T0(t, 7 , p) exp{/3v},
where v is the vector of factor variables, and 0 =(7 ,p, ßi, ß2, ß$, ■ • • ,ßn),  the 
vector of parameter variables.
The idea underlying the proportional hazards model is that the explana­
tory (interest-rate) variables, v , have an equi-proportional impact at all 
mortgage ages. That is, if variables v make prepayment more likely at a 
particular mortgage age, they make prepayment more likely at any other 
mortgage age. The vector of parameters ß=-(ß\, @2, ■ ■ ■ , ßn) measures the 
effect of the explanatory variables v upon the prepayment decision.
Schwartz and Torous use GNMA 30-year data over the period January 
1978 to November 1987. This provides prepayment data for individual mort­
gages with which to estimate the parameters 6.
Maximum likelihood is the method used to estimate the parameters. Nec­
essary conditions for the existence of maximum likelihood estimators of 6 are 
provided by:
<9 In L(0) 
dOi
=  0 ,
where L is the likelihood function.
The prepayment modelling of Sherris, Ang, McConnell and Singh, and 
Stanton are all developments from Schwartz and Torous’ model.
3.2.3 S tanton(1995)
The essential difference between Stanton’s approach and other prepay­
ment models is that Stanton’s model is non-linear.2 A non-linear prepayment 
model theoretically should be better than a linear model since the relation­
ship between prepayment and interest-rates is non-linear.
2 Although models such as those of Schwartz and Torous and McConnell and Singh, are 
technically non-linear, (because their leading term, (representing exogeneous prepayment), 
is not constant), they are log-linear in the non-time variables.
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Stanton’s prepayment model is part of his MBS valuation model and 
an outline of the prepayment model necessarily begins with some of the 
terminology and notation of the valuation model.
Stanton’s MBS valuation model is based on the assumption that “mort­
gage holders minimize the market value of their mortgage liabilities.” The 
value of mortgage liability, M(z, can be expressed, (using the Value Decom­
position Principle of section 1.3.2), as:
M‘ = Bt -
where
• Bt denotes the value of the underlying bond, (the present value of the 
stream of remaining cash flows on the mortgage at time t)\
• Vt is the value of the prepayment option to the mortgage holder.
Stanton reasons that since the value of Bt does not depend on the mortgage 
holder’s prepayment decision, minimizing the liability value Mtz, is equivalent 
to maximizing the prepayment option value Vtl. The mortgage holder max­
imizes the prepayment option value by following an optimal prepayment, 
(or optimal exercise), strategy. The mortgage holder is assumed to have 
transaction costs associated with prepayment and a varying capacity to pay 
these transaction costs; the variation in capacity is determined by variation 
in interest-rates.
T ransaction  C osts
Stanton uses the term “Transaction Costs” , denoted by V*, (“i” the ith 
mortgage holder), in a non-conventional sense: to the usual “tangible” costs 
included in this category such as break costs, stamp duty, insurance costs, 
and application fees for a new loan, Stanton adds “the value of non-monetary 
costs reflecting the difficulty and inconvenience of filling out forms, lost pro­
ductivity”, time taken to acquire information about mortgages, go to the 
bank, and so on. These transaction costs, he argues, will be proportional to 
the remaining outstanding principal Ft. So the mortgage holder has a call 
option on B t, with time-varying exercise price Ft( 1 4- X{). The relationship 
between Vt\  Ftj and Bt is shown in figure 3.2
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Bt = Ft( 1 + Xi) L
Figure 3.2: The relationship between V/, Ft, and Bt.
Stanton proceeds to establish that these transaction costs are a measure of 
the mortgage holder’s propensity to prepay. 3 There is a critical transaction 
cost X /, for a given contract mortgage rate and market mortgage rate rt, 
such that if X t < X /  the mortgage holder will optimally prepay. At the time 
of prepayment for the individual mortgage holder, the amount by which the 
market value of the loan Bt exceeds the remaining outstanding principal 
Ft, can be taken as a measure of the critical transaction cost X /  of that 
individual; hence at this time:
(3.2) Bt = Ft{\ + X'it)
Stanton’s transaction costs have the following properties:
• they are heterogeneous over mortgage holders;
• they are modelled as a random variable;
• they are homogeneous over pools. (Stanton’s later paper [55], models 
transaction costs as heterogeneous over pools).
3 If Bt is calculated as an annuity, transaction costs can be regarded as equivalent to 
“the refinancing incentive” of Richard and Roll as described on page 20, because, then 
Bt/Ft, (Stanton’s notation), is equal to A/P,  (Richard and Roll’s notation), with A the 
annuity value, and P  the principal outstanding. “ A / P ” is approximated by “C /R ” , which 
was also introduced on page 20.
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The initial distribution of prepayment transaction costs among mortgage 
holders is modelled with a beta distribution which is “chosen because it has 
many possible shapes, and constant support.” Using the assumption that the 
distribution of transaction costs of mortgage holders within a pool is a beta 
distribution, a generalization from (3.2) can be used to calculate the pro­
portion of the pool which has transaction costs below the critical transaction 
cost of the pool, (as is shown in the notes following the heading “Prepayment 
Model Specification” on page 77).
P rop ortion a l H azard M odelling  T heory A pplied
Stanton models prepayment for exogeneous reasons with a hazard func­
tion A such that the probability of prepayment in a time interval of length 
öt conditioned on not having prepaid prior to t is A5t. This implies, using 
the memoryless property of the exponential function, (subsubsection 1.5.3.1), 
that prepayment for exogeneous reasons only per year, will equal 1 — e~x i . 
Using Stanton’s terminology, with “Pe” representing prepayment for exoge­
neous reasons only:
(3.3) Pe = l - e ~ XSt.
(This is the unconditional probability of prepayment for exogeneous reasons 
only over a time interval of length 5t.)
In the mortgage-backed security data Pe will equal the average prepay­
ment rate, over all pools and over the time range of the data, when there is 
no financial refinancing incentive for prepayment, (that is when the current 
market mortgage rate is greater than the contract coupon rate).
Stanton proposes that, just as there is a hazard function A which governs 
the conditional rate of prepayment for exogeneous reasons only, there is also 
a hazard function p which governs the conditional rate or probability of refi­
nancing for interest-rate reasons only, p is a measure of the mortgage holder’s 
refinancing sensitivity; p may be regarded as a particular type of interest- 
rate sensitivity. More colloquially p represents “how often the mortgage 
holder thinks about refinancing (for financially advantageous (interest-rate) 
reasons)” . The following quote from Stanton [55] clarifies the relationship 
between these parameters A and p, transaction costs, interest-rates and mort-
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gage holder prepayment strategy:
For a given coupon rate, parameters A and p, and transaction 
cost there is a critical interest-rate, r*t, such that if r*< i*t 
mortgage holder i optimally refinances at time t ; if rt> r*t, the 
mortgage holder optimally chooses not to refinance. The higher 
the transaction cost X {, the lower r*t, since the benefits to refi­
nancing must be greater before they offset the costs incurred. For 
each mortgage holder, this leads to a hazard function governing 
prepayment, which takes on the value
|A  if rt > r 
\  A + p ifr*<r*t.
The hazard function governing prepayment for the pool as a whole 
takes on a value somewhere between A, (when r* is so high that 
no mortgage holder finds it optimal to prepay), and A -F p, (when 
rt is so low that all mortgage holders finds it optimal to prepay), 
the exact value depending on the proportion of mortgage holders 
in the pool for whom r*< r*t, which depends in turn on the value 
of rt and on the distribution of mortgages in the pool.
Thus Stanton has partitioned the prepayment decision into two decision 
categories and their corresponding probabilities:
(i) prepayment decision for exogeneous reasons, as previously described;
(ii) prepayment decision for either exogeneous or interest-rate reasons, (which 
has probability, from hazard function theory again:
(3.4) PT = 1 -  e- (x+p)s\
of occurring over a time interval of length St.
Prepayment Model Specification
The two probabilities Pe in (3.3), and Pr in (3.4), are part of the (non-
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linear) prepayment equation:
(3.5) wü = pe( i - p ; t) + pr.p;t
where:
i represents the ith pool, (previously the ith mortgage holder); 
t represents the tth time interval;
Wit is the model estimated prepayment of pool i in month t;
P*t is the proportion of pool i with transaction costs less than or equal 
to the critical transaction cost level X *(at time t). P*t is estimated using 
the following convergence relationship.
By the Law of Large numbers:
(3.6)
{number of random draws X: Bt > Ft(l +  X)} 
{total number of random draws X}
where the X ’s are random pdf variates from a beta distribution.
3.3 Em pirical Evaluation of Linear M odels  
A pplied to  F ixed -R ate D ata
Section 3.3 presents an empirical evaluation of the linear (variable-rate) 
models as described in sections 1 — 5 of chapter 2.
3.3.1 D a ta
Here these linear models are applied to the fixed-rate data as specified 
in the “Fixed and Variable Rate Pools” subsubsection 2.6.1.4 of chapter 
2. Figure 3.3 shows the interest-rate environment to which the four fixed- 
rate pools are responding. The arrows from circled numbers point to the 
respective pool origination times, that is the times when the weighted average 
seasoning, (WAS), of the respective pools is approximately zero; the arrows 
from bracketed numbers point to the respective approximate beginning dates 
of the data period for each pool.
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Figure 3.3: Fixed/Variable Rates Environment. For the four fixed-rate 
pools circled arrows point to respective approximate pool origination dates, 
bracketed arrows point to respective approximate pool data period beginning 
dates.
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Variable No.Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
CPR 199 26.0107 7.3476 3.7610 25.5400 48.9100
ParDFLT 199 1.206281 0.809351 0.000 1.25 2.7
ALTINV 199 0.043438 0.126267 0.000 0.0000 0.761522
FXDdifl 199 1.118593 0.676728 0.000 1.2 2.5
NLM 199 0.01005 0.09999 0.000 0.000 1.000
V'  N e w M i n 199 0.095477 0.294614 0.000 0.000 1.000
SEASONAL 199 0.251256 0.43483 0.000 0.000 1.000
BURNOUT 199 8.160804 6.743817 0.000 6.000 25.0
VOLy 199 1.045538 0.658242 0.000 1.008487 2.167686
ASLYC 199 1.501759 1.397427 -1.66 1.54 3.71
WALVR 199 65.59884 2.984536 56.62 65.51 74.27
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of the regression variables.
3.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics for those variables which pre­
liminary testing, (correlations and regressions), showed were most relevent. 
The notation is as follows: ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default, AL- 
TINV is alternative investment, FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, NLM is 
new long minimum, r NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage 
rate, SEASONAL is seasonality, BURNOUT is burnout, VOLy is volatility, 
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
3.3.1.2 Correlation Matrix
Table 3.2 provides the pairwise correlation matrix for the variables. Most 
of the notable correlations for the variable-rate pool data re-occurred in the 
fixed-rate data. In particular there are strong correlations between the time 
variables: (AGEPOOL and SQR(AGEPL)), and the variables: ParDFLT 
and FXDdifl. Again another potential source of multi-collinearity is the 
strong correlations between ParDFLT and FXDdifl. Surprisingly the corre­
lation between CPR and FXDdifl for the fixed-rate data, correlation!CPR, 
FXDdifl}=0.175649, is less than the corresponding correlation for the variable- 
rate data, 0.290776, (from table 2.4).
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3.3 .2  R egressions (fixed -rate data)
As for the variable-rate regression modelling the fixed-rate regressions 
begin with the unrestricted variable-rate model (2.7), (the augmented Mc­
Connell and Singh model). (2.7) is repeated here for the reader’s conve­
nience.
CPR = f(AGEPOOL,SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLT,ALTINV,FXDdifl,
BURNOUT,VOLy, ASLYC, NLM,SEASONAL,rNewMin)
3.3 .2 .1  U nivariate R egressions w ith  (to ta l) C P R  as dep en d en t 
variable
Using the fixed-rate pool data in the univariate tests the following six 
variables were found to have both a significant effect on CPR at 5% level (or 
better), and to have correct sign (for the theory):
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLyl,
where, as before the “1” suffixes denote the variables are lagged by one month. 
The remaining variables were therefore eliminated from further regressions. 
The main results are shown in table 3.3. Of the above six significant and 
correct sign variables AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL), ParDFLTl and VOLyl 
have the highest t-statistics.
3 .3 .2 .2  M u ltip le  R egressions w ith  (to ta l) C P R  as depend en t vari­
able
The first model to test as a multiple regression model is the model formed 
by the six variables:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLyl,
which passed the univariate regression tests. This model is henceforth re­
ferred to as the “revised unrestricted model”. The results of a regression for 
the revised unrestricted model are shown in the first column of table 3.4. As 
the correlation matrix of table 3.2 indicated was likely, and as occurred for 
the variable-rate data, the coefficient of the FXDdifl variable has changed
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E xp ected
In d ep en d en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A dju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.224659
(10.05024)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.335587
SQR(AGEPL) ± 0.185149
(9.378153)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.305141
ParDFLT 1 + 3.116457
(5.129910)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.113364
ALTINV -17.41328
(-4.401750)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.084924
FXDdifl + 1.898467
(2.504293)
0.0131 0.025933
V1 N e w M i n + -3.728249
(-2.12203)
0.0351 0.017384
BURNOUT1 -0.044781
(-0.577509)
0.5643 -0.003377
VOLyl + 3.988850
(5.381042)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.123722
ASLYC1 ± 0.239807 
( 0.643640)
0.5206 -0.002967
NLM1 + -6.359675
(-1.219387)
0.2242 0.002453
WALVR + -1.327229
(-8.984071)
0 . 0 0 0 0 0.287035
Table 3.3: U nivariate  R egression  C oefficients, t-s ta t is t ic s , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R  as dep en d en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant). 
Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without AGE- 
POOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate.
L egend o f variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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(R ev ised )1
Un-
restricted R estricted A lternative Two
M odel M odel B est M odels
Colum n 1 Colum n 2 C olum n 3 Colum n 4
D epend en t Variable:
C P R C P R C P R C P R
No. of O bs
Independent
Variables:
199 199 199 199
C o n s ta n t 17.61764 12.83291 12.53433 12.68060
(3.731073) (2.678082) (9.464243) (9.535589)
A G E P O O L 0.030498 0.186168 0.174298 0.201000
0.156140 (0.928848) (6.306101) (8.518423)
S Q R (A G E P L ) 0.140410 -0.017181
0.855799 (-0.102882)
P a rD F L T  1 3.003061 1.169963 1.102643
4.152862 (1.918771) (1.826458)
A LTIN V -4.748268 -3.880020
-1.330419 (-1 .042733)
VCRAl 1.702565 1.051991 1.783122 1.523908
2.481205 ( 1.898383) (3.142502) (2.762373)
FX D difl -3.814716
-4.297092
Log-L ikelihood -6 2 2 .3 8 0 2 -6 3 1 .5 1 6 6 -6 3 2 .0 7 6 6 -6 3 3 .7 6 4 4
L.R .S. 2 1.119838 4.495425
p-value 0.571255 0.212699
BIC 6.441274 6.506498 6.458926 6.449290
a d ju s te d  R 2 0.414770 0.361811 0.364792 0.357222
Table 3.4: M ultip le R egression  C oefficients and t-sta tist ics  for (to ­
ta l) C P R
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated”.
2 “L.R.S.” denotes “Liklihood Ratio Statistic” .
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
tNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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to the wrong sign due to multi-collinearity with AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL), 
or ParDFLTl. The very high correlationjFXDdifl, ParDFLTl}=0.760603, 
implies a high probability that only one of these variables will be included 
in a multiple regression model. Though the results are not shown in ta­
ble 3.4, when the hypothesis that FXDdifl is redundant is tested, this hypoth­
esis is rejected, (p-value 0.000019). Regardless of the rejection of FXDdifl 
as redundant by the liklihood ratio test, the wrong sign of FXDdifl (ac­
cording to theory), over-rides that directive. Hence FXDdifl is eliminated 
and the next tested regression model, formed from the restricted model of 
(2.8) of section 2.5 of chapter 2, is as shown in column 2 of table 3.4 . 
The five variables which remain after FXDdifl is eliminated: AGEPOOL, 
SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, VOLyl, together are a subset of the 
restricted model (2.8); (the restricted model is formed by these five vari­
ables plus SEASONAL). The results in column 2 show that each of the 
five variables has correct sign but none are significant at 5% level. The 
p-values for AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, VOLyl are 
0.35, 0.92, 0.06, 0.30, 0.06 respectively. Clearly there are multi-collinearity 
problems with this combination of variables. Multiple regressions with: (i) 
ParDFLTl, AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL), as independent variables, (ii) ParD­
FLTl, AGEPOOL, as independent variables, produce individual p-values 
for ParDFLTl of 0.1229 and 0.2889 respectively , revealing the high multi- 
collinearity between ParDFLTl and the time variables. (The model of col­
umn 3 , (which will be discussed shortly), by comparison gives a p-value 
of 0.0693 for ParDFLTl, the linear combination of VOLyl and ParDFLTl 
fortuitously resulting in a lower multi-collinearity between AGEPOOL and 
ParDFLTl.)
Conducting a series of liklihood ratio tests, (using the methodology as 
shown in subsection 2.6.2.2 “Multiple Regressions”in chapter 2,), leads to 
the two alternative “best” models as shown in columns 3 and 4 of table 3.4. 
The model of column 3 is formed by the hypothesis that the coefficients of the 
variables SQR(AGEPL) and ALTINV are jointly zero, that is, the hypothesis 
that these variables are redundant. The liklihood ratio statistic:
(3.7) LRS = -2(RLLF-ULLF)
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follows a chi-square distribution with the degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of additional parameters in the (revised) unrestricted model. In 
(3.7) RLLF is the log-liklihood function of the restricted model and ULLF 
is the log-liklihood function of the unrestricted model. From column 4 the 
liklihood ratio statistic is:
LRS(*2) = ~2(—632.0766 -  (-631.5116))
-  1.119838,
with corresponding p-value 0.571255. Clearly the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL) 
and ALTINV are redundant cannot be rejected.
Similar analysis, (as applied to column 3 model), is now applied to column 
4 model:
The model of column 4 is formed by the hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the variables SQR(AGEPL) ALTINV and ParDFLTl are jointly zero, that 
is, the hypothesis that these variables are redundant. From column 4 the 
liklihood ratio statistic is:
LRS(xs) =  —2(—633.764 -  (-631.5116))
= 4.495425,
with corresponding p-value 0.212699. Clearly the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL) 
ALTINV and ParDFLTl are redundant cannot be rejected.
Column 3 and 4 models are difficult to choose between. Column 3 model 
is preferred in having a slightly higher adjusted R2 but is disadvantaged in 
having ParDFLTl as not significant at 5% level; (the p-value of ParDFLTl is 
0.0693). Column 4 model is preferred by being both more parsimonious and 
having a lower Bayesian Information Criterion statistic. Column 3 model is 
included nevertheless for comparison with the variable-rate model regression 
results where ParDFLTl was the only interest-rate variable in the “best” 
model (of table 2.6).
The volatility of interest-rates as the most significant of (interest-rate) 
variables suggests that fixed-rate lenders are more affected by interest-rate 
volatility than variable-rate lenders; the higher risk aversion of fixed-rate 
lenders (in comparison to variable-rate lenders), is an explanation of this
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FXDdifl ALTINV VOLyl Log-liklihood BIC adjusted R2
1.481746
(2.0882)
-10.01609
(-2.439374)
3.124179
(4.13328)
-659.1383 6.730903 0.166254
Table 3.5: Multiple Regression results for a model with FXDdifl as 
the main interest-rate variable.
phenomenon.
Returning to the FXDdifl variable:
As mentioned previously the multi-collinearity of the FXDdifl variable with 
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL) and ParDFLTl, which causes the coefficient of 
FXDdifl to change to the wrong sign, leads to the elimination of FXDdifl in 
the search for a best model. However in recognition of the fact that FXDdifl is 
the only significant refinancing variable, (in the univariate modelling), a pre­
payment model where FXDdifl is included, (and AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL) 
and ParDFLTl excluded), is tested. This model is shown in table 3.5; (co­
efficient values and t-statistics, (in brackets), are the numbers beneath the 
respective variable names). Each of the variables FXDdifl, ALTINV, and 
VOLyl are of correct sign and significant at 5% level. However the overall 
significance of the model, as shown by the adjusted R2=0.166254 is much 
lower compared to the models of table 3.4 columns 3 and 4 , (0.364792 and 
0.357222 respectively).
3.3 .3  CPRpartiai and CPRpunwith fixed -rate data.
As in Subsection 2.6.3, “CPRPartiai and CPRpuii” , of the variable-rate pre­
payment model chapter, the CPR/SMM formula 1.2 provided corresponding 
fixed-rate data items CPRpartiai and CPRpuii. Again the idea is that breaking 
CPR, ((total) CPR), into these components will assist further in explain­
ing how the independent variables are contributing. Table 3.6 provides the 
descriptive statistics for CPRpartiai, CPRpuii and the ratio of CPRpartiai to 
CPRpuii. Whereas partial prepayments are usually approximately one third 
of full prepayments for the variable-rate data, the ratio is closer to a quarter 
for the fixed-rate data, (using the means and medians in tables 2.7 and 3.6 
for comparisons). Presumably fixed-rate lenders, having taken out insurance
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V a r ia b le N o .O b s M e a n S t d  D e v M in M e d ia n M a x
C P R p a r t i a i 199 5.713082 2.625906 -3 .4 2 2 8 1 4 5 .702086 13.37583
C P R fuII 199 21.49803 6.943993 2.209524 21.17994 46.50950
C P  R p a r t i a l  /  CPRpull 199 28 .90602 15.39713 -9 .961622 27 .19009 106.2660
Table 3.6: Summary statistics for C P R partiai, CPRpuh, and their ratio 
for the fixed-rate data.
against rate rises by fixing, feel less need to reduce their mortgage debt, ( 
and hence future interest payments), with partial prepayments. Figure 3.4 
shows how the ratio of CPRpartiai to CPRpuiiis varying over the respective 
data periods of the four fixed-rate pools.
3.3 .3 .1  CPRpartiai as dependent variable
The univariate regressions with CPRpartiai as dependent variable, (see 
table 3.7), find the following four variables:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, VOI/1,
both significant at 5% level and to have correct sign. (Partial prepayment 
theory has only been developed for the variables ParDFLT, ALTINV, and 
VOLy, (in section 2.3); hence the expected signs of the coefficients of all other 
variables as regressors for CPRpartiai, are indeterminate.)
Column 1, with heading “(Revised) unrestricted model” in table 3.8, 
shows the results for a regression with these four variables as independent 
variables. [These four variables are a subset of the restricted model (2.8) 
of section 2.5 in chapter 2.] ParDFLTl and VOLyl are both significant at 
5% level or better while both AGEPOOL and SQR(AGEPL) are insignif­
icant. The sign of the coefficient for AGEPOOL is negative, suggesting a 
slight reduction of partial prepayment as the pool ages. Since AGEPOOL 
and SQR(AGEPL) are both insignificant in this model they are tested for 
redundancy in the models of columns 2 and 3.
Column 2 of table 3.8, shows the results for a liklihood ratio test of the 
hypothesis that the variable SQR(AGEPL) is redundant to the model of
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♦  par/full
Figure 3.4: R atio  C P R p artia i to  CPRpunfor th e  four fixed-rate pools.
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E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A d ju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL 0.021934
(2.261142)
0.0248 0.020349
SQR(AGEPL) ± ' 0.016796
(1.999358)
0.0469 0.014913
ParD FLTl + 0.526964
(2.319727)
0.0214 0.021648
ALTINV -2.324507
(-1.578715)
0.1160 0.007481
FXDdifl i 1 0.337501
(1.231079)
0.2198 0.002597
^ N e w M i n i 1 0.101835
(0.160374)
0.8728 -0.004945
BURNOUT1 i 1 -0.021304
(-0.769248)
0.4427 -0.002066
VOLyl + 0.985108
(3.576722)
0.0004 0.056212
ASLYC1 i 1 -0.219007 
( -1.654428)
0.0996 0.008697
NLM1 1.435449
(0.939381)
0.3487 -0.000594
SEASONALl i 1 -0.324852
(-0.761085)
0.4475 -0.002130
Table 3.7: U nivariate R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values  
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R partiai as depend en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Partial prepayment theory has only been developed for the variables ParDFLT, ALTINV, 
and VOLy, (in section 2.3). Hence the expected signs of the coefficients of all other 
variables as regressors for CPRpartiab are indeterminate.
Legend o f variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
V ip  r\ -f i 1 i
Empirical Evaluation of Linear Models Applied to Fixed-Rate Data 91
column 1. From column 2 the liklihood ratio statistic is:
LRS(x?) = —2(—465.0225 -  (-464.7692))
-  0.506488,
with corresponding p-value 0.476663. Clearly the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL) 
is redundant cannot be rejected.
Similarly column 3, (“Best model”), of table 3.8, shows the results for a 
liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that both the variables AGEPOOL and 
SQR(AGEPL) are redundant to the model of column 1. From column 3 the 
liklihood ratio statistic is:
LRS(y2) = —2(—465.0882 -  (-464.7692))
= 0.637960,
with corresponding p-value 0.72689. Hence the hypothesis that AGEPOOL 
andSQR(AGEPL) are redundant cannot be rejected.
In this “best model” both VOLyl and ParDFLTl are significant at 5% 
level and of correct sign. Although the significance level of the best model 
overall is low, (adjusted R2=0.076224), both this value and the BIC, (4.754052), 
confirm that the best model is an improvement on the unrestricted model 
with adjusted R2= 0.069688 and BIC=4.804045.
To have two out of the three partial prepayment variables as proposed in 
section 2.3, and no other independent variables, included in the (final) best 
CPRpartiai model is a positive affirmation of the partial prepayment theory(of 
section 2.3).
3.3.3.2 C P R fuII as dependent variable
As was stated in the corresponding “CPRpuu as dependent variable” sub­
subsection in the “Variable-Rate Prepayment Model” chapter on page 59, be­
cause the partial prepayment variables have no theory for full prepayment the 
expected sign of their coefficients is prima facie indeterminate when CPRpuii 
is the dependent variable. For this reason ALTINV and VOLy variables have 
an indeterminate expected sign in the univariate regressions (in table 3.9); 
however ParDFLTl variable was re-assessed as being also a full prepayment
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(R ev ised )1 SQ R -
U n- (A G E PO O L )
restricted R edun dant B est
M odel M odel M odel
C olum n 1 C olum n 2 C olum n 3
D ep en d en t Variable:
C P R p artial C P R p a rtia l ^ P P -P artia l
No. of Obs
In depend en t
Variables:
199 199 199
Constant 5.596713 4.229077 4.094441
(2.762489) (7.471151) (9.678696)
AGEPOOL
SQR(AGEPL)
-0.062691
(-0.747859)
0.048771
(0.703130)
-0.004378
(-0.358986)
ParD FLTl 0.537759 0.555342 0.506795
(2.061237) (2.141256) (2.295137)
VOLyl 1.226177 1.020793 0.969034
(4.247603) (3.304630 ) (3.555092)
Log-Likelihood -4 6 4 .7 6 9 2 -4 6 5 .0 2 2 5 -4 6 5 .0 8 8 2
Liklihood Ratio Statistic 0.506488 0.637960
p-value 0.476663 0.726890
BIC 4.804045 4.779991 4.754052
adjusted R2 0.069688 0.072100 0.076224
Table 3.8: M ultip le R egression  C oefficients and t-sta tistics  for
C P R p a rt ia l  •
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated” .
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
vNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
Empirical Evaluation of Linear Models Applied to Fixed-Rate Data 93
variable, (in “ParDFLT Variable Reviewed” section in chapter 2), and has 
expected sign positive.
Taking into account the preceeding notes regarding expected signs of co­
efficients the univariate regressions with CPRpuii as dependent variable, (see 
table 3.9), select the same significant at 5% level and correct sign variables as 
the univariate regressions with (total) CPR as dependent variable; namely:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, V0IA1.
Unsurprisingly then the transition from the revised unrestricted model, (col­
umn 1, table 3.10), to restricted model, (column 2), follows a similar pattern, 
with FXDdifl 1 being eliminated because of incorrect sign; the 5 variables re­
maining in the restricted model of CPRpuii are identical to those of the (total) 
CPR restricted model, namely:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, VOL^l.
However from hereon a different pattern develops.
Liklihood ratio tests of redundancy on each of the five variables AGE- 
POOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, and VOL>T, fail to reject them 
(individually) as redundant. However a liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis 
that all five variables together are redundant is rejected as highly unlikely. 
The liklihood ratio statistic, (not shown in table 3.10), is:
LRS(xs) =  —2(—667.5050 -  (-623.5932))
=  87.82375,
with corresponding p-value 0.000000. Hence at least one of the five variables 
is not redundant; we have a closer look at these apparently contradictory 
results in the following:
The liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that AGEPOOL is redundant 
is shown in column 3 of table 3.10; AGEPOOL is selected as least likely 
redundant, (lowest p-value), by the liklihood ratio statistic:
LRS(xi) = —2(—624.9158 -  (-623.5932)) 
= 2.645314,
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with corresponding p-value 0.103856; (so at 10% significance level AGE- 
POOL is only just rejected.) Column 4, (best model) of table 3.10), now 
shows the the results of a liklihood ratio test testing the hypothesis that all 
five variables except AGEPOOL are redundant. The liklihood ratio statistic 
is:
LRS(x4) = -2(-626.6017 -  (-623.5932))
-  6.017064,
with corresponding p-value 0.197878. Clearly this hypothesis should not be 
rejected. The best model suggests that the AGEPOOL variable alone suffi­
ciently explains the variation in CPRpuii. Although this result is intuitively 
reasonable, (and consistent with a PSA type prepayment model where pool 
seasoning is all that needs taking into account), subsection 2.6.3.4, which ad­
dresses the problem of models including AGEPOOL but not SQR(AGEPL)), 
in the variable-rate prepayment model regression results, should probably be 
kept in mind; the restricted model result suggests the exogeneous prepay­
ment does level off, and this probably would have been even more relevent if 
our data period had been longer.
3.3 .4  C onclusions (C om parison  o f fixed -rate  and variable- 
rate d ata  Linear R egression  M od els)
Noteworthy comparisons between the variable-rate and fixed-rate data results 
include:
(i) Counter to expectations:
• Lower correlations between CPR and the variables ParDFLT and 
FXDdifl in the fixed-rate data.
• As for the variable-rate data ALTINV coefficient, with CPRpuii as 
dependent variable, is negative and significant in the univariate 
regressions; why remains unclear.
(ii) In accord with expectations:
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E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A dju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.211730
(10.00832)
0.0000 0.333707
SQR(AGEPL) i 1 0.176400
(9.489029)
0.0000 0.310205
ParDFLT 1 + 2 0.2.824620
(4.915353)
0.0000 0.104723
ALTINV ± 2 -16.45805
(-4.402157)
0.0000 0.084939
FXDdifl + 1.771207
(2.471238)
0.0143 0.025144
V1 N e w M i n + -4.042831
(-2.443700)
0.0154 -0.024494
BURNOUT1 -0.038407
(-0.524019)
0.6009 -0.003677
VOLyl ± 2 3.285254
(4.599703)
0.0000 0.092398
ASLYC 1 ± 0.405160
(1.153327)
0.2502 0.001665
NLM1 + -2.588300
(-0.639762)
0.5231 -0.002992
SEASONALl + -1.206205
(-1.070189)
0.2858 0.000733
Table 3.9: U nivariate  R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R fuh as depend en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without 
AGEPOOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate. 
z The expected signs of the partial prepayment variables, (with CPRfuh as dependent 
variable), are discussed on page 91.
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, VOLy is rate volatility,
NLM is new long minimum,
T NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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(R ev ised )1
Un- AG EPO O L
restricted R estricted R edundant B est
M odel M odel M odel M odel
Colum n 1 Colum n 2 C olum n 3 Colum n 4
D ependent Variable:
C P R fu ii C P R fu ii C P R fu ii C P R fu ii
No. of O bs
Independent
Variables:
199 199 199 199
C o n s ta n t 12.11295 7.216670 14.32339 9.565527
(2.677835) (1.585069) (13.16844) (7.602887)
A G E P O O L 0.136396 0.300131 0.211730
(0.743481) (1.607073) (10.00832)
S Q R (A G E P L ) 0.051360 -0.109507 0.135906
(0.335306) (-0.708803) (5.775523)
P a rD F L T  1 2.618116 0.888293 0.873191
(3.756808) (1.519070) (1.487380)
V O Lyl 1.001226 0.384868 1.487246
(1.072388) (0.400640 ) (2.202489)
A LTIN V -5.960997 -5.150604 -5.302676
(-1.749775) (-1.453381) (-1.490758)
FX D difl -3.599149
(-4.186846)
Log-L ikelihood -6 1 4 .8 9 9 8 -6 2 3 .5 9 3 2 -6 2 4 .9 1 5 8 -6 2 6 .6 0 1 7
L.R .S . 2 2.645314 6.017064
p-value 0.103856 0.197878
BIC 6.366095 6.426865 6.413559 6.350703
ad ju s te d  R 2 0.392209 0.340154 0.334771 0.333707
Table 3.10: Multiple Regression Coefficients and t-statistics for
C P R fuii-
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated”.
2 “L.R.S.” denotes “Liklihood Ratio Statistic” .
L egend  o f  variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
tNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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• As already mentioned the volatility variable VOLy is much more 
significant as a partial prepayment predictor in the fixed-rate data. 
This is taken as the first clear sign that partial prepayment is not 
confined to variable-rate mortgage holders.
• ParDFLTl is again highly significant as a partial prepayment re­
gressor, (as was the case for the variable-rate data).
• AGEPOOL is again highly significant as a full prepayment regres­
sor, (as was the case for the variable-rate data).
3.4 S ta n to n  M o d el A p p lied  to  A u s tra lia n  D a ta
3.4 .1  M od el S pecification
The Stanton model which is applied to the Australian data, is as specified 
by equation (3.4) in the literature review of subsection 3.2.3.
3.4 .2  M od el T esting  Fram ew ork:G M M  
3.4.2.1 H ansen’s GM M
The GMM used to evaluate the Stanton model is Tom Smith’s program 
which is based on Hansen(1982) [31], and Hansen and Singleton(1982) [32], 
as was the GMM used by Stanton. From [31] and [32] are obtained three 
(distributional) statements which are used in the GMM tests of how the 
model fits the data:
(I) VTgT(8 ) Z  N(0,Sy,
(II) TgT(OyS-'gT(e) “ X(*#eqns- # u„knowns);
(III) Vf(8-0)~AT(0, [Ö 'S -'D ]-1)
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where:
T denotes the maximum number of time steps in the data set;
Q=(a,ß, A, p), (the vector of parameters to be estimated); 
gr{0) is the (m-element) vector of the moment conditions;
S  is the variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions;
D is the Jacobian matrix, ;
N  denotes the normal distribution;
~  denotes asymptotic convergence, (which is due to the central limit 
theorem, in each of the three distributional statements).
3 .4 .2 .2  M om ent C onditions
For each pool i = 1,.. .  ,4, two moment conditions are calculated as:
/o o\ 0 = I v f  lC P R > t - { P e * l l - P : t]+ Pr*P; t}}
T  L^ [CPRit -  {Pe *[1 -  p;t] + Pr * p ;t}* SyrFXD,., J ’
where the lagged 3 year fixed-rate, 3yrFXDt_!, is being used as an instru­
mental variable, giving a total of eight moment conditions.
3.4 .3  M odel E valuation
3.4 .3 .1  D ata  and M odel C alcu lation
From the data as described in subsection 2.6.1 and subsection 3.3.1, the fol­
lowing data items were extracted for testing the Stanton model, (as described 
in subsection 3.2.3): CPRpuu, WAS, AVGE_LOAN_SIZE,and 3yrFXD.
CPRpuiiwas chosen as an alternative to (total) CPR since the Stanton 
model is designed exclusively for full prepayments which occur through refi­
nancing or exogeneous prepayment only.4
4 From the linear modelling we know that there exist explanatory variables that are not 
included in the (Stanton) model; for example the CPRpuu data will include prepayments 
which are due to variable-rate mortgage holders fully prepaying in order to take out a 
cheaper rate loan, or in order to switch to a fixed-rate loan, (as described in “ParDFLT 
Variable Reviewed” subsubsection 2.6.3.3 in chapter 2). This modelling problem motivates 
a combined model which is the topic of chapter 4.
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AVGE_LOAN_SIZE is proxy for the outstanding principal on the mort­
gage holder’s loan, (and hence equal to Ft).
To maximize the effect of time correlated events or changes, the data for 
GMM testing was organized into contemporaneous sets as follows. Only time 
steps, (months), where each pool contained a complete set of the necessary 
data items for calculations, were used for GMM testing. There were 42 
months where each of the 4 pools met this requirement; (so the number of 
observations shrinks from 199, (for the linear model testing), to 4 x 42 = 168 
for GMM testing).
The Stanton model(with the Reuters data), uses a conventional time se­
ries GMM, (averaging across time to obtain gT(0)), because the number of 
pools is small relative to the number of months of observations; (Stanton’s 
GMM, by comparison, is non-conventional in that the averaging is done 
across pools at each time step, (because in the Stanton United States data 
the number of pools is much larger than the number of time steps)).
B t C alcu lation
Each of the variables, WAS, AVGE_LOAN_SIZE,and 3yrFXD, is used in 
the calculation of Rt, (denoting, in Stanton’s notation, the current market 
value of the stream of monthly repayments).
Data limitations, namely only having one fixed-rate, the 3-year fixed-rate, 
to represent all categories of fixed-rate mortgage rates, impels a simplification 
in the calculation of P*t\ we assume the entire pool of mortgages has the same 
fixed-rate. This assumption implies there is a uniform pool origination rate 
(for all mortgage holders in the pool); Bt calculation, (and hence critical 
transaction cost, X*t) estimation, as part of P*t calculation), is done as for 
the individual mortgage holder, using the annuity method as described by 
equation (1.1) in “Value of (loan) Stream of Cash Flows” section 1.3.1, in 
chapter l .5
5The amount of monthly payments is calculated using the 3yrFXD interest-rate at pool 
origination; the value of the resulting stream of cash flows is calculated using the 3yrFXD 
current market rate as the discount rate, the term of the loan remaining being taken as: 
(25 years minus the current WAS).
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J statistic 7.177580 
P Value 0.126796
Parameters Parameter Estimates Standard Errors T-Ratios 
a  5.000016403 0.000160462 31160.097656250
ß  2.200028872 0.000082440 26686.482421875
A 0.267499658 0.000016977 15756.587890625
p 0.255009580 0.000021646 11780.790039062
Table 3.11: GM M  Results (fixed-rate data)
3=4.3.2 Results
In the G M M  tests the J statistic function, (gri^YS~lgx{0)), was ex­
tremely flat; from a line check for the minimum J statistic, the results for the 
G M M  tests of the Stanton model on Australian (Reuters) data, are shown 
in table 3.11. The p-value, in G M M  results in table 3.11, is the probability 
that a chi-square random variable, with (number of moment conditions less 
number of unknown parameters) degrees of freedom, will have a value larger 
than the value of the J statistic, (which corresponds to Hansen’s statement 
II in subsubsection 3.4.2.1). Hence in table 3.11, p-value 0.126796 is the 
probability that a chi-square random variable with four degrees of freedom, 
is larger than the J statistic value 7.177580. Since the p-value is greater than 
0.05 the G M M  test is not rejecting the model at 5% level of significance. 
Parameter Estimate Results Assessed
(i) A =  0.267499658, (Standard Error=0.000016977.)
With this value for A,
Pe =  expected proportion of pool prepaying for exogeneous reasons per year,
=  1 — e~x
= 0.2366205 or approximately 24%.
The NAB and Westpac MBS papers, [45] and [60] respectively, contain 
results of tests on data over a similar time-frame; these papers support 
the validity of this estimate.
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Also the fact that the pools all contain a large proportion of variable- 
rate mortgages leds to an expectation of a higher exogeneous prepay­
ment than what would be expected for pools consisting purely of fixed- 
rate mortgages, (as for the US Stanton data, where the obtained es­
timate for A was 0.0345). Variable-rate mortgage pools in the US in 
general show a higher prepayment rate than fixed-rate pools, (see for 
example exhibit 20 — 17 in Mansukhani and Srinivasan [42]); (hence 
they are expected to have higher exogeneous prepayment rates). That 
variable-rate borrowers self-select because they are more mobile than 
fixed-rate borrowers is often proposed as an explanation of this phe­
nomenon. Discussion related to this issue also occurs in the McConnell 
and Singh literature review, page 29, where the “two-plateau” phe­
nomenon is discussed.
Figure 3.5 shows the predicted exogeneous prepayment for CPRpuii re­
stricted model of table 3.10; here exogeneous prepayment levels off at 
approximately 27%. (The Stanton model Pe of 23.66% is an average 
rather than a ceiling.)
(ii) p  =  0.25500958, (Standard Error=0.000021646)
With this value for p,
Pr — expected proportion of pool refinancing per year,
= l - e ~ p
= 0.2211992 or approximately 22%;
Stanton’s obtained estimate for p was 0.6073, (SE 0.0077).
There are two reasons why refinancing sensitivity is expected to be 
lower in Australia than the US:
• because the Australian fixed-rate mortgage holder is invariably 
looking at a maximum remaining loan term period, (before adjust­
ment to current market rates), of five years, the potential savings, 
made from exercising the refinancing option, will usually be much 
less than for the US fixed-rate mortgage holder who may have up 
to thirty years remaining loan term period.
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• “break” costs, associated with refinancing in Australia, are not 
part of the US refinancing process.
(iii) a  =  5.00001643, ß  =  2.200028872
(Standard Errors=0.000160462, 0.00008244, respectively)
The corresponding estimates, (SEs), in Stanton’s results were 2.9618, (0.0919), 
and 4.2268, (0.1245) respectively.
These results would appear to suggest that Australian mortgage pools 
have a lower concentration of low transaction costs loans than US mort­
gage pools.
3.5 C onclusions
Conclusions in relation to the linear regression modelling results have al­
ready been made in subsubsection 3.3.4.
The linear modelling tests on fixed-rate data did not find interest-rate 
changes to have a strong influence on full prepayment. Whether this is a 
true description of Australian mortgage prepayment, or whether the results 
were affected by the fact that only one fixed-rate, (the three year fixed-rate), 
is being used to represent a diverse group of fixed-rate mortgage holders, was 
clarified by the Stanton model testing, which showed more clearly evidence 
of the effect of interest-rate changes on refinancing of fixed-rate loans.
The Stanton model test results also showed that Australian mortgage 
holder refinancing sensitivity is much lower than the refinancing sensitivity of 
the U.S. mortgage holder. The main reason for this is the shorter term length 
of Australian fixed-rate mortgages compared to their U.S. counterparts.
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-------a*t+b*t2+c
Relative AGE of Pool
Figure 3.5: Linear m odel predicted exogeneous prepaym ent. Fig­
ure 3.5 shows the predicted exogeneous CPR for the restricted model, (with 
CPRFuiias dependent variable), of table 3.10 column 2. (The restricted model 
is chosen for the comparison by virtue of having the preferred property of 
correct sign for SQR(AGEPL), (that is negative)). Model predicted exoge­
neous prepayment levels off at approximately 27%. This compares well to 
the Stanton model Pe of 23.66% which is an average rather than a ceiling.
C h a p te r  4
C o m b in ed  P re p a y m e n t M o d e l
4.1 Introduction
As was stated in chapter 3, “Fixed-Rate Prepayment Model”, from the 
linear modelling we know that there exist explanatory variables that are not 
included in the (Stanton) model; for example the CPRpuii data will include 
prepayments which are due to variable-rate mortgage holders fully prepaying 
in order to take out a cheaper rate loan, or in order to switch to a fixed-rate 
loan, (as described in “ParDFLT Variable Reviewed” subsection in chapter 
2). This modelling problem motivates a combined model which is the topic of 
the present chapter. The combined model is formed directly from the models 
of the preceeding chapters: the Stanton model as for the fixed-rate data, 
is combined with the “best” model for the variable-rate data. Section 4.2 
describes a GMM test of the combined model with details of the model 
formulation being given in section 4.2.2, “Moment Conditions” .
Section 4.3 is an empirical evaluation of the linear (variable-rate) models, 
(as specified in chapter 2), applied to the combined data (as described in 
subsection 4.2.1). Section 4.4 contains conclusions.
4.2 G M M  test o f C om bined M odel
105
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4.2 .1  D a ta
How should the fixed-rate and variable-rate data be combined for testing 
the combined model? The fact that Stanton’s model is part of the founda­
tions for the combined model means that rather than combining the data to 
form a cross-sectional data file as appropriate for linear regression testing, 
the data should be arranged in a form appropriate for GMM model testing. 
Applying the ideas regarding maximizing the effect of time-correlated events 
or changes, as discussed in subsection 3.4.3, “Model Evaluation”, required 
selecting from the twelve available pools an optimal set of common months, 
(each month containing a complete set of necessary data items) for the op­
timal number of pools. Four of the variable pools combined with the four 
fixed pools, each with 34 observations, (months), was found to provide the 
optimal arrangement.
4.2 .2  M om ent C ond itions
The combined model is formed by combining the (fixed-rate) Stanton 
model, (having moment conditions as specified by (3.8)), with the “best 
model” for the variable-rate, namely, CPR  =  const + b\AGEPOOL + 
b2ParD FLT  1, as given by the results of table 2.11 Hence the moment con­
ditions for the combined model become
(4.1)
T
E
t — \
[CPRil -  {Pe * [1  -  Pul + Pr * PÜ}}
[CPRit -  {Pe * [1  -  Pul + Pr * p;t}l * 3yrFXDI(_,
[CPRjt — {const + b\ * AGEPOOLjt +  b2 * ParDFLTl j t}}
for each fixed-rate pool i — 1,. . .  , 4, and each variable-rate pool j  = 1, . . .  ,4, 
where the lagged 3 year fixed-rate, SyrFX D ^, as in moment conditions (3.8), 
is being used as an instrumental variable. Model (4.1) gives a total of twelve 
moment conditions.
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J statistic 6.672338 
P Value 0.246171
Parameter Estimates Standard Errors T-Ratios
const
AGEPOOL
ParDFLTl
ß
a
X
P
6.295525962 0.000409225 15384.040039062
0.983359967 978.958456888 0.001004496
0.245052194 0.006305086 38.865795135
0.179057001 178.255540686 0.001004496
0.010948917 0.004040424 2.709843397
0.012093712 0.009961200 1.214081883
2.078323164 1.401638550 1.482781053
Table 4.1: GMM Results, (combined data)
4 .2 .3  R esu lts
The results for the GMM tests of the combined model are shown in ta­
ble 4.1. Since the model p-value 0.246171 is greater than 0.05 the GMM test 
is clearly not rejecting the model at 5% level of significance.
Parameter Estimate Results Assessed
Comparison to the Stanton model parameter estimates for the fixed-rate 
data, gives the following notes:
• there is very little difference between estimates of A: approximately 
0.25 for combined data, versus approximately 0.27 for fixed-rate data.
• the ratio of a  to ß is approximately 6.3 to 1 for the combined data 
versus approximately 5.0 to 2.2 for the fixed-rate data. This indicates 
a lower concentration of low transaction cost loans than for the fixed- 
rate data, as expected.
• p is approximately 0.18 for the combined data, versus approximately 
0.26 for the fixed-rate data, implying refinancing sensitivity is lower 
than for the fixed-rate data, again as expected.
Of the three parameter estimates for the linear variable-rate component 
of the combined model, the constant is the only significant result.
The high standard errors for the parameter estimates for /?, p, and the 
ParDFLT coefficient are probably due to the low ratio of the number of
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time steps, (34), in the data, to the number of moment conditions, (12). 
Although these high standard errors are reason for concern about the ac­
curacy and validity of these results, each of the estimates themselves, when 
compared with the estimates obtained for the fixed-rate data, are consistent 
with expectations about how estimates should change if fixed-rate mortgage 
data is augmented by variable-rate mortgage data.
4.3 E m p iric a l E v a lu a tio n  of L in ear M odels  
A pp lied  to  C o m b in ed  D a ta
Section 4.3 presents an empirical evaluation of the linear (variable-rate) 
models, (as described in sections 1 — 5 of chapter 2), applied to the combined 
data as specified in subsection 4.2.1, which has been concatenated into a 
single cross-sectional data set (of 8 x 34 = 272 observations).
As the reader is assumed to understand better the methodology used in 
the linear modelling, (as shown in the variable-rate and fixed-rate prepayment 
model of chapters 2 and 3), some of the explanation and commentary has 
been adjusted accordingly in the following sections.
4.3.1 D ata
4.3 .1 .1  D escrip tive S ta tistics
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the combined model data 
for each of the linear model variables. The statistics for the full and partial 
prepayments are included here rather than in a separate table as was done 
in the variable-rate and fixed-rate descriptive statistics tables. Mean (total) 
CPR, CPRpartiai, and CPRpuii, are approximately 27.1, 6.77 and 21.68 per­
cent respectively, figures which are closer to the corresponding variable-rate 
statistics than the corresponding fixed-rate statistics.
4 .3 .1 .2  C orrelation M atrix
Table 4.3 provides the pairwise correlation matrix produced by the combined 
data for each of the linear model variables.
Empirical Evaluation of Linear Models Applied to Combined Data 109
V ariab le N o .O b s M ean S td  D ev M in M ed ia n M ax
CPR 272 27.10647 7.228946 9.9800 26.8200 55.9300
CPRpartial 272 6.777738 3.277529 -3.422814 6.634723 18.30679
CPRpuH 272 21.68360 6.837567 8.556092 21.64865 53.56506
ParDFLT 272 1.349265 1.171108 0.0000 1.4500 4.45000
ALTINV 272 0.045567 0.138992 0.000 0.0000 0.761522
FXDdifl 272 0.934926 0.933881 0.000 0.6500 3.6500
NLM 272 0.000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000
V1 N e w M i n 272 0.088235 0.284160 0.000 0.000 1.000
SEASONAL 272 0.205882 0.405090 0.000 0.000 1.000
BURNOUT 272 6.716912 6.171952 0.000 4.000 24.0
VOLy 272 1.180809 0.634470 0.000 1.190631 2.167686
ASLYC 272 1.590294 1.500279 -1.66000 1.79000 3.7100
Table 4.2: S u m m a ry  s ta t is t ic s  o f th e  re g re ss io n  v a riab les , (for com ­
b in e d  d a ta ) .
L egen d  o f  variab les:
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
rNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
NLM is new long minimum,
SEASONAL is seasonality.
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4 .3 .2  (com bined  data) R egressions
Since the impetus for the combined model comes from the Stanton model, 
(combined with the “best” variable-rate model), which has CPRpuii as the 
dependent variable, the order for the linear regressions changes accordingly; 
specifically “CPRpuii as dependent variable” regressions are done first.
4.3.2.1 CPRpuii as d e p e n d e n t v a riab le
As was stated in the fixed-rate prepayment model chapter 3 on page 91:
Because the partial prepayment variables have no theory for full 
prepayment the expected sign of their coefficients is prima fa­
cie indeterminate when CPR^n is the dependent variable. For 
this reason ALTINV and VOLy variables have an indeterminate 
expected sign in the univariate regressions; however ParDFLTl 
variable was re-assessed as being also a full prepayment variable,
(in “ParDFLT Variable Reviewed” section in chapter 2), and has 
expected sign positive.
Table 4.4 shows the results for the univariate regressions with CPRpuii as de­
pendent variable using the combined model data. The univariate regressions 
select the variables:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLy, ASLYC1, 
as significant at 5% level of significance and of correct sign. (These same 
seven variables were the univariately selected variables for the variable-rate 
data with both “(total) CPR as dependent variable” and “CPRpuii as depen­
dent variable” regressions.) Again the ALTINV significant and negative sign 
anomaly appears as for the variable-rate and fixed-rate “CPRpuii as depen­
dent variable” data. The significance of ASLYC1, (as for the variable-rate 
(total) CPR and CPRpuii regressions), again presumably shows evidence of 
switching from variable-rate to fixed-rate.
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOLy, and 
ASLYC1 become the variables for the (revised) unrestricted model as shown 
in column 1 of table 4.5. The incorrect sign for the FXDdifl coefficient makes 
that variable the first target for redundancy. Column 2 table 4.5 shows the
112
results of a liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that FXDdifl is redundant 
to column 1 model. The liklihood ratio statistic is given by:
LRS(xi) = —2(—856.1377 -  (-855.8730))
= 0.529444,
with corresponding p-value 0.466841. Clearly the hypothesis that FXDdifl is 
redundant cannot be rejected.
In the column 2 model SQR(AGEPL) is the least significant variable, 
(having a p-value of 0.8098); column 3 table 4.5 shows the results of a likli­
hood ratio test of the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL) and FXDdifl are jointly 
redundant to column 1 model. The liklihood ratio statistic is given by:
LRS{xl )  =  —2(—856.1675 -  (-855.8730))
= 0.589045,
with corresponding p-value 0.744887. Clearly the hypothesis that FXDdifl 
and SQR(AGEPL) are jointly redundant to column 1 model cannot be re­
jected.
Since VOLy and ASLYCl show only weak significance in column 3, (hav­
ing p-values of 0.2903 and 0.1841 respectively), these variables are next tested 
for redundancy. The best model, as shown in column 4, is formed from the 
hypothesis that VOLy, ASLYCl, SQR(AGEPL) and FXDdifl are jointly re­
dundant to column 1 model. The liklihood ratio statistic is given by:
LRS(xl) = — 2(—857.3283 -  (-855.8730))
= 2.910621,
with corresponding p-value 0.572892. Clearly the hypothesis that VOLy, 
ASLYCl, FXDdifl and SQR(AGEPL) are jointly redundant to column 1 
model cannot be rejected. Hence the “best model” has AGEPOOL, ParD- 
FLT1, and ALTINV as predictor variables.
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4 .3 .2 .2  A L T IN V  variable review ed
We have noted previously that our proposed partial prepayment variable 
ALTINV, as a predictor for full prepayments, consistently is significant and 
has negative sign; (this result occurred in the univariate regressions for both 
variable-rate and fixed-rate data).
In preparation for the following discussion in relation to the ALTINV 
variable we note that the variation in ALTINV is mainly determined by the 
variation in the (All Ordinaries) share market index. The basis of the defini­
tion of the ALTINV variable, (see equation (2.3), which defines ALTINV), is 
the ratio of average after-tax share market return over the previous year, to 
the current mortgage variable-rate. Because the mortgage rate is relatively 
static and the average share market return more volatile, the variation in 
ALTINV is mainly determined by the variation in the share market index.
Possibly the ALTINV variable is showing a negative association between 
the average share market returns and the willingness of professional investor 
mortgage holders to sell their properties; alternatively stated, the professional 
investor mortgage holder recognizes that a time when the share market is 
booming is not a good time to sell because then shares are a competing 
investment for potential buyers. If the preceeding explanation is correct, the 
professional investor mortgage holder will also be watching property returns. 
The best time to sell an investment property would be when property returns 
are high relative to share returns; the worst time to sell would be when share 
returns are high relative to property returns.
A robustness check on the ALTINV variable was made to check our former 
surmise(s).
Using the listed property index “GICS22”, a variable: R a o a~Rg \cs22 , (the 
difference between average return on shares and average return on property), 
was formed and regressions, with CPRpuii as dependent variable, carried out.1 
Although univariately very significant and correct sign, in multiple regres­
sions the variable became insignificant and wrong sign; correlation testing 
showed these problems were due to multi-collinearity with the time variables:
lrThe notation here for R aoa and -RgicS22 is consistent with the notation for equa­
tion (2.3), (which defines ALTINV).
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AGEPOOL and SQR(AGEPL).
While the latter results do not corroborate our former surmised hypoth­
esis/explanation for ALTINV in relation to full prepayments, we need to 
take into account the fact that ALTINV is a complex variable. ALTINV 
does not just reflect share market index variation; there are several factors 
in the definition /calculation of ALTINV which might account for the lack 
of corroboration by the robustness tests.
4 .3 .2 .3  CPRpartiai as depend en t variable
The univariate regressions with C P R p art ia i as dependent variable, (see ta­
ble 4.6), find the following four variables:
ParDFLTl, VOL*, BURNOUT, rNewMinl,
significant at 5% level. ParDFLTl and VOLy have correct sign for partial 
prepayment theory while BURNOUT and rNewMinl have no theory for partial 
prepayment.
Column 1, with heading “(Revised) unrestricted model” in table 4.7, 
shows the results for a regression with these four variables as independent 
variables. At 10% level of significance variables ParDFLTl, VOLy, and 
BURNOUT are significant, while rNewMinl is not. Column 2 of table 4.7, 
shows the results for a liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that the variable 
vNewMin I is redundant to the model of column 1. From column 2 the liklihood 
ratio statistic is:
LRS(xi) = —2(—699.0834 -  (-698.303))
= 1.560748,
with corresponding p-value 0.211556. Clearly the hypothesis that rNewMinl is 
redundant cannot be rejected.
The restricted model of column 2, (with predictors ParDFLTl, VOLy, 
and BURNOUT), is taken as the “best model” though, as the p-value of 
0.0628 for ParDFLTl and the following liklihood ratio test for the redun­
dancy of ParDFLTl show, the decision to include ParDFLTl is borderline. 
ParDFLTl’s inclusion in the “best model” is perhaps influenced slightly by
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E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A djusted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.200298
(9.665938)
0.0000 0.254328
SQR(AGEPL) i 1 0.167170 
( 9.101960)
0.0000 0.231959
ParDFLT 1 + 2 2.777445
(8.886606)
0.0000 0.223433
ALTINV ± 2 -13.19788 
(-4.576106 )
0.0000 0.068539
FXDdifl + 2.834450
(6.899192)
0.0000 0.146722
V1 N e w M i n + 2.002434
(1.372176)
0.1711 0.003247
BURNOUT1 -0.069968
(-1.046269)
0.2964 0.000349
VOLy + 2 1.636055
(2.475121)
0.0139 0.018565
ASLYC 1 ± 0.605469 
(2.198619 )
0.0288 0.013950
NLM1 + Near Singular M atrix
SEASONALl + -2.310403
(-2.270528)
0.0240 0.015102
Table 4.4: U nivariate  R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R fuh as dep en d en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without 
AGEPOOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate. 
z The expected signs of the partial prepayment variables, (with CPRfuII as dependent 
variable), are as justified on page 91, (for the fixed-rate data).
L egen d  o f  variab les:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, VOLy is rate volatility,
NLM is new long minimum,
vNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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(R e v ise d )1 SQ R -
U n - F X D d ifl (A G E P O O L )
restr ic ted R ed u n d a n t R ed u n d a n t B e st
M od el M o d el M o d e l M o d el
C olu m n  1 C olu m n  2 C olu m n  3 C olu m n  4
D e p e n d e n t V ariable:
C P R fuIi CPRpuii C P R fuIi C P R fuIi
No. of O bs 272 272 272 272
In d ep en d en t
V ariables:
C o n stan t 12.36070 11.68226 12.50551 13.93798
(3.121463) (3.040882) (7.128438) (9.766070 )
A G E P O O L 0.117330 0.143781 0.108776 0.102621
(0.767579) (0.970150) (3.705392) (3.535504)
S Q R (A G E P L ) -0.002041 -0.029526
(-0.015889) (-0.240983)
P a rD F L T  1 1.868277 1.484330 1.508050 1.748049
(2.682452) (3.334690) (3.480144) (4.415982)
A LTIN V -6.293239 -6.606666 -6.679178 -7.094637
(-2.038370) (-2.163637) (-2.201985) (-2.539834)
V O Ly 0.642358 0.584001 0.675345
(0.859122) (0.786460 ) (1.059517)
FX D difl -0.566007
(-0.717198)
A SLY C 1 0.244201 0.373813 0.364960
(0.737931) (1.349656) (1.331798)
Log-L ikelihood -855.8730 -856.1377 -856.1675 -857.3283
L.R .S. 2 0.529444 0.589045 2.910621
p-value 0.466841 0.744887 0.572892
BIC 6.458061 6.439397 6.419007 6.386323
ad ju s te d  R 2 0.302117 0.303396 0.305863 0.305137
Table 4.5: Multiple Regression Coefficients and t-statistics for
C P R fuIi-
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated”.
2 “L.R.S.” denotes “Liklihood Ratio Statistic” .
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment, VOLy is rate volatility,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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E xp ected
Independ en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A dju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL -0.003449
(-0.299344)
0.7649 -0.003371
SQR(AGEPL) ± ] -0.006067 
( -0.603231)
0.5469 -0.002353
ParDFLT 1 + 0.357508
(2.116368)
0.0352 0.012675
ALTINV -1.877606
(-1.312539)
0.1905 0.002660
FXDdifl i 1 -0.029685
(-0.138990)
0.8896 -0.003632
^ N e w M i n i 1 2.099108
(3.041210)
0.0026 0.029540
BURNOUT1 i 1 -0.087184
(-2.734824)
0.0067 0.023350
VOLyl + 0.926800
(2.938347)
0.0036 0.027398
ASLYC1 i 1 0.046959 
(0.353283 )
0.7242 -0.003240
NLM1 i 1 Near Singular M atrix
SEASONALl i 1 -0.074066
(-0.150427)
0.8805 -0.003620
Table 4.6: U nivariate  R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  C P R Partiai as depend en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Partial prepayment theory has only been developed for the variables ParDFLT, ALTINV, 
and VOLy, (in section 2.3). Hence the expected signs of the coefficients of all other 
variables as regressors for CPRpartiai, are indeterminate.
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality, BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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a wish for consistency with the partial prepayment regression results for the 
variable-rate and fixed-rate data. Column 3 of table 4.7, shows the results 
for a liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that ParDFLTl, (and rNewMinl), 
are redundant to the model of column 1. From column 3 the liklihood ratio 
statistic is:
LRS(xl) = —2(—700.8438 -  (-698.303))
= 5.081577,
with corresponding p-value 0.078804. The test does not reject that ParD­
FLTl and r NewMinl are jointly redundant at 5% level of significance. However 
at 10% level of significance the test is rejecting that ParDFLTl and rNewMinl 
are jointly redundant; also column 2 model is preferred according to the 
adjusted R2 criterion.
The simultaneous univariate significance of the refinancing burnout vari­
ables r NewMinl and BURNOUT2 could suggest that fixed-rate mortgage hold­
ers tend to think about refinancing when rates fall to a new minimum, but 
opt instead to increase partial prepayments, with the impact (of the rate 
change) on these partial prepayments steadily decreasing as the length of 
time from the rate change increases.
4 .3 .2 .4  (to ta l) C P R  as dep en d en t variable
Table 4.8 shows the results for the univariate regressions with (total) CPR 
as dependent variable using the combined model data. The univariate regres­
sions select the seven variables:
AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, FXDdifl, VOL", rNewMinl,
as significant at 5% level of significance and of correct sign. The two variables: 
ASLYC1 and BURNOUT1, with p-values of 0.0538 and 0.0671 respectively, 
are borderline significant at 5% level of significance, and of correct sign.
The seven variables: AGEPOOL, SQR(AGEPL),ParDFLTl, ALTINV, 
FXDdifl, rNewMinl , VOLy, plus the two borderline variables: BURNOUT1
2That these variables were not significant for the fixed-rate C P R p artiai data is possibly 
a reminder that the fixed-rate/variable-rate division of the data is an imprecise division.
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(R ev ised )1 B est
U n- M odel
restricted B est W ith ou t
M odel M odel ParD FLT
C olum n 1 C olum n 2 C olum n 3
D ep en d en t Variable:
^ - 'P P - P a r t ia l ^ - 'P P - P a r t ia l ^ - 'P P 'P a r t ia l
No. of Obs
In depend en t
Variables:
272 272 272
Constant 5.919212 5.878880 6.296166
(11.16811) (11.10187) (13.05268 )
ParD FLTl 0.278770 0.309742
(1.664573) (1.868583)2
VOLy 0.702815 0.839848 0.862568
(2.124484 ) (2.690871) (2.753043)
BURNOUT -0.064398 -0.076248 -0.080152
(-1.956652) (-2.418623) (-2.536364 )
^ N e w M i n  ^ 0.950901
(1.239541)
Log-Likelihood -6 9 8 .3 0 3 0 -6 9 9 .0 8 3 4 -7 0 0 .8 4 3 8
Liklihood Ratio Statistic 1.560748 5.081577
p-value 0.211556 0.078804
BIC 5.237629 5.222757 5.215092
adjusted R2 0.057220 0.055333 0.046583
Table 4.7: M u ltip le  R egression  C oefficients and t-sta tist ics  for
C P R p a r t i a l  •
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated” .
2 P-value 0.0628.
Legend of variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential, NLM is new long minimum, 
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality, BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
120
E xp ected
Ind ep en d en t
Variables:
Sign
of
C oefficient
C oefficient
and
t-sta tist ic p-value
A d ju sted
R 2
AGEPOOL + 0.185425
(8.141514)
0.0000 0.194134
SQR(AGEPL) i 1 0.152436
(7.559008)
0.0000 0.171605
ParD FLTl + 2.855238
(8.491551)
0.0000 0.207849
ALTINV -13.91038 
( -4.560939)
0.0000 0.068095
FXDdifl + 2.628224 
( 5.931413)
0.0000 0.112004
V'  N e w M i n + 3.486129
(2.273156)
0.0238 0.015144
BURNOUT1 -0.129450 
(-1.838620 )
0.0671 0.008708
VOLyl + 2.299135
(3.318953)
0.0010 0.035640
ASLYC 1 ± 0.565045
(1.936917)
0.0538 0.010052
NLM1 + Near Singular Matrix
SEASONAL + -1.877474 
(-1.738399 )
0.0833 0.007406
Table 4.8: U nivariate R egression  C oefficients, t-sta tist ics , p-values 
and adjusted  R 2s, (w ith  (to ta l) C P R  as d ep en d en t variable).
The coefficient values, t-statistics and p-values are for individual variables only, while the 
adjusted R2s are for each of the complete regression models (which include a constant).
1 Because SQR(AGEPL) is not designed to occur as an independent variable without 
AGEPOOL, the expected sign of the coefficient of SQR(AGEPL) is indeterminate.
Legend o f variables:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative to the 
highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the data set). 
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
NLM is new long minimum,
t NewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
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and ASLYC1, become the variables for the (revised) unrestricted model as 
shown in column 1 of table 4.9. As for the “CPRpuii as dependent variable” 
regressions, the incorrect sign for the FXDdifl coefficient makes that variable 
the first target for redundancy. Column 2 table 4.9 shows the results of a 
liklihood ratio test of the hypothesis that FXDdifl is redundant to column 1 
model. The liklihood ratio statistic is given by:
LRS(xi) = —2(—875.0069 -  (-873.3972))
= 3.219243,
with corresponding p-value 0.072777. As well as being of incorrect sign, at 
5% level of significance the hypothesis that FXDdifl is redundant cannot be 
rejected.
Column 2 model variables SQR(AGEPL), rNewMinl, and ASLYCl have 
p-values of 0.7104, 0.7515 and 0.9399 respectively, and hence are next tested 
for redundancy. Column 3 shows the model formed from the hypothesis 
that SQR(AGEPL), rNewMinl, ASLYCl and FXDdifl are jointly redundant to 
column 1 model. The liklihood ratio statistic is given by:
LRSfoJ) = - 2 ( —875.1359 -  (-873.3972))
= 3.477419,
with corresponding p-value 0.481320. Clearly the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL), 
N^ewMinC ASLYCl and FXDdifl are jointly redundant to column 1 model can­
not be rejected.
VOLy variable, (in column 3), which has p-value 0.12934, is clearly the 
next candidate for redundancy. The best model, as shown in column 4, is 
formed from the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL), rNewMinl, ASLYCl, FXDdifl 
and VOLy are jointly redundant to column 1 model. The liklihood ratio 
statistic is given by:
LRS(xs) = —2(—876.3146 -  (-873.3972))
= 5.834649,
with corresponding p-value 0.322642. Clearly the hypothesis that SQR(AGEPL), 
N^cwMinlj ASLYCl, FXDdifl and VOLy are jointly redundant to column 1
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model cannot be rejected.
“Best model” variables: AGEPOOL, ParDFLTl, ALTINV, and BURNOUT1 
are each of correct sign and significant at 5% level, though of course ALT- 
INV’s contribution to the model must be accepted as more likely a full pre­
payment regressor rather than a partial prepayment regressor, (after taking 
into account the “CPRpuii as dependent variable” regressions).
4.4 C onclusions
As stated in section 4.2, “GMM test of Combined Model” , although some 
parameter estimates had high standard errors, when compared with the esti­
mates obtained for the fixed-rate data, the combined model GMM parameter 
estimates are consistent with expectations about how (fixed-rate) parame­
ter estimates should change if fixed-rate mortgage data is augmented by 
variable-rate mortgage data.
The linear (variable-rate) model tests on the combined model data are 
surprisingly more responsive, (than the corresponding tests on the variable- 
rate and fixed-rate data), in several ways:
• Three variables: rNewMin, BURNOUT, ASLYC, which were in all other 
tests insignificant, (at 5% level), become significant for the combined 
data. ASLYC becomes a (univariate) significant predictor for the 
CPRpuii; rNewMin and BURNOUT become (univariate and “best model” 
respectively), significant predictors for CPRpartiai- The latter result 
provides further evidence that partial prepayment is not confined to 
variable-rate mortgage holders, (since both rNewMin and BURNOUT are 
variables which are defined in terms of the fixed interest-rate).3
• ALTINV is a “best model” CPRpuii predictor. That ALTINV was suf­
ficiently significant as a CPRpuii predictor to become a “best model” 
variable is also unprecedented. The most plausible explanation for why
3The first evidence that partial prepayment is not confined to variable-rate mortgage 
holders was the significance of the volatility variable in the fixed-rate regressions
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(R ev ised )1
Un-
restricted B est
M odel M odel
Colum n 1 Colum n 2 Colum n 3 Colum n 4
D epend en t Variable:
C P R C P R  C P R C P R
No. of O bs 272 272 272 272
Independent
Variables:
C o n stan t 21.44531 18.94967 20.43170 21.75343
(4.881122) (4.536866) (11.52239) (14.03731)
A G E P O O L 0.000992 0.130794 0.067531 0.068004
(0.005312) (0.758930) (2.142542) (2.152344)
S Q R (A G E P L ) 0.070407 -0.052740
(0.446771) (-0.371687)
P a rD F L T  1 3.164353 2.062473 2.104826 2.102332
(4.008956) (4.248430) (4.883427) (4.865706)
A LTIN V -6.931617 -7.648052 -7.774205 -9.655930
(-2.096977) (-2.322000) (-2.400227) (-3.217654)
V O L y 1.261778 0.911964 1.004102 1.523908
(1.389474) (1.024911) (1.521594) (2.762373)
FX D difl -1.675989
(-1.766157)
^ N e w M i n  1 0.437653 -0.487736
(0.270217) (-0.316978)
A S L Y C l -0.197503 0.026476
(-0.531073) (0.075427)
B U R N O U T 1 -0.057038 -0.126992 -0.113802 -0.124580
(-0.624829) (-1.537883) (-1.854485) (-2.038776)
Log-Likelihood -8 7 3 .3 9 7 2 -8 7 5 .0 0 6 9 -8 7 5 .1 3 5 9 -8 7 6 .3 1 4 6
L.R .S . 2 3.219243 3.477419 5.834649
p-value 0.072777 0.481320 0.322642
BIC 6.628134 6.619360 6.558481 6.546537
ad ju s te d  R 2 0.284352 0.278586 0.286044 0.282528
Table 4.9: M ultiple Regression Coefficients and t-statistics for (to­
tal) CPR
1 “Revised” means “after variables rejected by univariate regressions have 
been eliminated” .
2 “L.R.S.” denotes “Liklihood Ratio Statistic” .
L egend  o f  variab les:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, (relative 
to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all pools in the 
data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared, ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default, 
ALTINV is alternative investment, FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
VOLy is rate volatility, ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve,
NLM is new long minimum, BURNOUT is burnout,
SEASONAL is seasonality,
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ALTINV is highly significant and negative as a regressor for full pre­
payments, (over all rate categories, variable-rate, fixed-rate, and com­
bined), is that the professional investor mortgage holders, (who fully 
prepay rather than partially prepay), are careful to choose an oppor­
tune time to sell their properties; when the share market is booming 
is not such a time because then shares will be competing for potential 
buyers’ dollars.
Apart from the above noted differences the results for the combined data 
linear modelling were consistent with results for the variable-rate and fixed- 
rate data; specifically, ParDFLTl and VOLy were “best model” predictors 
for partial prepayments, and ParDFLTl and AGEPOOL were “best model” 
predictors for full prepayments.
C h a p te r  5
L inear M odels R esu lts  
C om pared
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 presents a comparison of the results for the linear model re­
gressions of chapters 2, 3 and 4. The comparison is not extended to the 
Stanton model because the dependent variable for the Stanton model tests 
was restricted to CPRpuii; that is only full prepayments were tested with the 
Stanton model.
5.2 Sum m ary of Linear M odel Test R esu lts
Table 5.1 is a summary of the results for the linear model regressions. 
The “best (restricted) model” variables are shown in bold type for each 
rate data-type, (variable-rate, fixed-rate, combined), and each dependent- 
variable type, (CPRpartiai, CPRpuii, (total) CPR). Each “best (restricted) 
model” variable is significant at 5% level of significance except (for the two 
cases) where the p-values are given (in the footnotes). The other variables 
shown in each category are the remaining univariately significant variables, 
(that is the variables of each revised unrestricted model which were not “best 
(restricted) model” variables).
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The results of the table have already been assessed in the preceeding 
chapters so only a few extra comments are necessary.
For CPR.partiai •
ParDFLTl is a “best (restricted) model” for each rate category, (though for 
the combined data ParDFLTl is only borderline significant with a p-value of 
0.0628). Variable VOLy, (VOLyl for fixed-rate data), is a “best (restricted) 
model” for fixed-rate and combined data.
For C P R fuh:
ParDFLTl is a “best (restricted) model” for variable-rate and combined data 
but not fixed-rate data.
For (to ta l) CPR:
In each rate category the union of those variables which are “best (restricted) 
model” variables for CPRpartiai and CPRpuii forms the “best (restricted) 
model” variables for (total) CPR, except:
(i) in the variable-rate category where SQR(AGEPL) is a “best (restricted) 
model” variable for the “(total) CPR as dependent variable” regressions, but 
not a “best (restricted) model” variable for either the “CPRpartiai as depen­
dent variable” regressions, or the “CPRpuii as dependent variable” regres­
sions.
(ii) in the combined rate data category where volatility is a “best (restricted) 
model” variable for the “CPRpartiai as dependent variable” regressions, but 
not a “best (restricted) model” variable for the “(total) CPR as dependent 
variable” regressions.
The fact that the data set is small may be taken as a possible explanation 
for the inconsistencies between the various rate categories, in particular the 
extra “best (restricted) model” variable, BURNOUT for the combined data.
Of the eleven independent variables the only two which do not appear in 
table 5.1, are:
• SEASONAL
The coefficient of SEASONAL had an incorrect sign for all univariate 
regressions; therefore we concluded that no seasonal effect on prepay­
ment is apparent for the Australian data. [In fact possibly the Aus­
tralian data is tending to suggest a negative association between full
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T Y P E  o f (R ate) DATA;
V ariable-R ate F ixed -R ate C om bined
No. of Obs
D ep en d an t Variable:
336 199 272
CPRpartiai P arD F L T l P arD F L T l P a rD F L T l1
FXDdifl VO Lyl
AGEPOOL
SQR(AGEPL)
VO Ly
B U R N O U T
^ N e w M i n  1
CPRpuii A G EPO O L A G E PO O L A G EPO O L
P arD F L T l ParD FLTl P arD F L T l
ALTINV ALTINV A L TIN V
VOLyl VOLyl VOLyl
SQR(AGEPL) SQR(AGEPL) SQR(AGEPL)
FXDdifl
ASLYC1
FXDdifl FXDdifl
ASLYCl
(total) C PR A G EPO O L A G E PO O L A G EPO O L
P arD F L T l P a rD F L T l2 P arD F L T l
ALTINV ALTINV A L TIN V
VOLyl VO Lyl VOLyl
SQ R (A G E P L ) SQR(AGEPL) SQR(AGEPL)
FXDdifl
ASLYC1
FXDdifl FXDdifl
ASLYCl
B U R N O U T 1
^ N e w M i n  ^
Table 5.1: Linear M odels C om pared
1 Borderline with p-value 0.0628.
2 Borderline with p-value 0.0693.
The “best (restricted) model” variables are shown in bold type for each rate 
data-type, (variable-rate, fixed-rate, combined), and each dependent-variable 
type, (CPRpartiai, CPRpuii, (total) CPR). The other variables shown in each 
category are the remaining univariately significant variables, (that is the 
variables of each revised unrestricted model which were not “best (restricted) 
model” variables).
A “Legend of Variables” for table 5.1 is shown on page 128.
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prepayments and the summer months rather than the positive associ­
ation of our proposed hypothesis which was formulated according to 
observed U.S. prepayment patterns.]
• NLM
The long-rate was represented by the 10 year bond rate. There were no 
“new long minimum” s between October 1998 and March 2003. Only 
two of the pools contained data prior to (and including) October 1998. 
(There were no “new long minimum” s for any pool for the combined 
data.) Probably the most appropriate verdict as to whether NLM vari­
able has an effect on Australian mortgage prepayment, is “no verdict 
either way”.
M u lti-co llin earity  o f FX D difl, ParD FLT P rob lem
The main deficiency of the multiple linear regression models is that the 
FXDdifl variable is not seen as making a meaningful contribution: the mod­
eller has to make the choice between including FXDdifl with a negative co­
efficient or eliminating FXDdifl. As has been stated on numerous occassions 
the negative coefficient of FXDdifl in the multiple regressions is due to the 
multi-collinearity between ParDFLT and FXDdifl. FXDdifl represents the 
fixed-rate mortgage holder’s incentive to prepay and the univariate regres­
sions show that the variable is consistently significant (across all rate data 
categories). Hence for the multiple regressions either modelling choice, in­
clusion or elimination, is not entirely satisfactory.
L egend o f variables for tab le  5.1:
AGEPOOL is the relative weighted average age of mortgages in the pool, 
(relative to the highest weighted average age of mortgages, (WAS), over all 
pools in the data set).
SQR(AGEPL) is AGEPOOL squared.
ParDFLT is partial prepayment by default,
ALTINV is alternative investment,
FXDdifl is 3 year fixed differential,
vNewMin is a new minimum in the 3 year fixed mortgage rate,
BURNOUT is burnout,
VOLy is rate volatility,
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ASLYC is change in the slope of the yield curve.
5.3 C onclusion
Linear modelling test results comparisons have been facilitated by pre­
senting the main results in a single table.
C h a p te r  6 
C onclu sio n s
The “Conclusions” chapter presents a retrospective summary of the thesis.
The variable-rate prepayment modelling research began (in chapter 2) 
with a literature review of the leading U.S. articles on variable-rate loan 
based MBS prepayment models. Comparisons with, and how the modelling 
ideas apply to, the Australian prepayment of variable-rate loans environment, 
were made throughout. From the various reasons for partial prepayment in 
Australia, an Australian prepayment model was formulated. The combina­
tion of this prepayment model and the U.S. variable-rate prepayment models 
gave an unrestricted Australia prepayment model, which was then subjected 
to closer examination with a view to formulation of a more parsimonious, or 
restricted, Australian prepayment model. Empirical testing of these models 
was carried out on Australian prepayment data. The tests revealed that, 
for variable-rate mortgage holders, both partial prepayment and full prepay­
ment are strongly affected by the amount by which the mortgage holder’s 
highest interest-rate level attained over the prior course of the loan, exceeds 
the current market mortgage variable-rate. The tests also revealed that, for 
variable-rate mortgage holders, the ratio of average after-tax share market 
returns to mortgage rates is highly negatively associated with full prepay­
ments.
The fixed-rate prepayment modelling research began with a literature 
review of the leading U.S. articles on fixed-rate loan based MBS prepayment 
models. The non-linear Stanton(1995) prepayment model was included in
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this literature review. An empirical evaluation of the (linear) variable-rate 
models applied to the fixed-rate Australian prepayment data followed the 
literature review. These tests showed that
• partial prepayment is not confined to variable-rate mortgage holders;
• fixed-rate mortgage holders’ partial prepayment is affected by the volatil­
ity of rates, (over the previous year);
• for fixed-rate mortgage holders, a fall in rates often triggers partial 
prepayment (rather than the expected refinancing), the impact of the 
rate change, on the partial prepayments, fading as time, (from the rate 
change), passes.
The Stanton model, when tested on the same fixed-rate Australian prepay­
ment data, revealed that refinancing sensitivity in Australia is much less than 
U.S. refinancing sensitivity.
A combined model, formed directly from the fixed-rate Stanton model 
and the optimal variable-rate model, largely corroborated the results of the 
variable-rate and fixed-rate prepayment models. One result in particular, 
which the combined model re-affirmed, is that the ratio of after-tax share 
market returns to mortgage rates is highly negatively associated with full 
prepayments, consistently, over all rate categories, (variable, fixed, and com­
bined).
Findings unrelated to interest-rates included:
• that the average number of months since origination of the mortgages in 
the pool, has a strong influence on full prepayments consistently, (over 
all the categories of rate types: variable-rate, fixed-rate, and combined), 
as is the usual case for full prepayments in the U.S..
• that mortgage holders in Australia, when compared to their U.S. coun­
terparts, are much more likely to prepay their loans for non-interest-rate 
related reasons such as relocation or changes in family circumstances.
R esearch C ontrib ution
The components of the thesis research which are original are developments
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from the unique characteristics of the Australian mortgage market. The Aus­
tralian mortgage market is represented by a new prepayment data set which 
required new prepayment modelling theory. Whereas previous Australian 
empirical research on mortgage prepayment had been restricted to fixed-rate 
loan prepayment models, this thesis augments and develops the Australian 
prepayment research field by including prepayment of variable-rate loans and 
partial prepayment. The development and testing of these extensions to the 
Australian prepayment research field is the main contribution of the thesis.
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